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Pharmaceutical markets are characterized by a high degree of innovation, complexity and un-
certainty, especially markets of idiosyncratic symptomatolgy and response to treatment such as the
antidepressant market. It may, therefore, be unreasonable to assume that consumers are aware of
all antidepressants for sale at the time of purchase, as is the case in traditional models of consumer
choice. Such an assumption will bias demand curves towards being more elastic and the evaluation
of consumer welfare downwards. This paper, therefore, aims at analyzing and evaluating the eﬀects
of promotions by pharmaceutical ﬁrms on patient welfare taking into account the interaction of
multiple agents (patients, physicians, insurance companies and pharmaceutical companies) in the
decision process.
I present an empirical discrete-choice model of limited information, where advertising inﬂuences
the set of drugs from which a purchase choice is made. The estimation technique incorporates both
macro- and micro-level data. Estimation results indicate that pharmaceutical ﬁrms use advertising
media to target high-income households and households with more comprehensive prescription
drug insurance schemes through their physicians or directly. Model comparison shows that limited
information leads to less elastic demand curves and larger estimates of patient welfare due to
pharmaceutical innovation that exacerbate the moral hazard issue that coexists with insurance
coverage.
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1I INTRODUCTION
Annual sales of pharmaceuticals through retail pharmacies have climbed to $220.2 billion in 2010.3
In 2001 over 4 billion antidepressant drugs were sold in the U.S., generating over $12 billion in
revenues – over $150 million of which was spent on advertising. In the pharmaceutical industry
innovation occurs rapidly. In 2010 a patient in the U.S. can be prescribed one of 64 antidepressants
(brands and generics) relative to 47 drugs in 2001 and 19 in 1980. Patients, therefore, are unlikely
to be aware of all drugs available to them. This is ether because patients are unaware of the
existence of a drug, because patients are unaware of the possibility that a drug could be used
in their treatment, or simply because patients are unaware of their illness. More importantly,
patients’ choice sets are created with limited information, a common attribute of many industries.
This problem is exacerbated in the antidepressant market, where symptomatology of the disease,
major clinical depression, and response to pharmacological treatment is idiosyncratic.
I formulate an empirical methodology that quantiﬁes patient welfare from pharmaceutical inno-
vation in the U.S. antidepressant market and I isolate the eﬀect of promotional eﬀorts by pharma-
ceutical ﬁrms on welfare. I utilize a structural discrete choice model with observed and unobserved
consumer heterogeneity and limited information on the part of consumers adding to the existing
literature.4 In doing so, I show, ﬁrst, that traditional models, which assume consumers are aware
of all products for sale at the time of purchase, generate inconsistent estimates of drug-speciﬁc
demand curves that are biased towards being too elastic. I, therefore, use data on promotional
activity by pharmaceutical ﬁrms directed towards physicians and towards patients to account for
informative advertising. Second, I employ additional information on media exposure to estimate a
model of limited information which improves the estimated price elasticities. In many industries,
data on individual exposure to advertising are diﬃcult to obtain. However, variation in adver-
tizing exposure across households is an important source of consumer heterogeneity. I combine
macro-level advertising data with micro-level data relating consumer attributes to media exposure,
thereby permitting a model which allows for individual heterogeneity in choice sets and advertising
media exposure while having limited data connecting consumers to purchases and advertising.
312 months to March 2010; source: IMS Health Inc.,
4Berry (1994), Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes [BLP] (1995, 2004), Petrin (2002), Cleanthous (2003, 2009), Sovinsky
Goeree (2008).
2Recent structural studies of advertising incorporate micro purchase and advertising exposure
data.5 Sovinsky Goeree (2008) augments the stuctural work by Berry, Levinsohn, Pakes [BLP]
(1995) and Petrin (2002) to add limited information and relax the assumption of full awareness. In
the pharmaceutical industry, Berndt et al. (1994) examine non-structurally product-level demand
for anti-ulcer medications. They concentrate on marketing variables, and distinguish between
‘industry-expanding’ and ‘rivalrous’ marketing eﬀorts by looking at a natural experiment: the
introduction of Tagamet and, later, Zantac.
The limited information model as introduced by Sovinsky Goeree (2008) incorporates three im-
portant sources of consumer heterogeneity: choice sets, tastes, and advertising media exposure. The
results suggest that advertising has very diﬀerent informative eﬀects across types of agents, individ-
ual consumers and across media, and that allowing for heterogeneity in patient information yields
more realistic estimates of demand elasticities. The results also suggest that assuming full informa-
tion may lead to incorrect conclusions regarding welfare eﬀects of innovation and, consequently, the
size of the moral hazard that arises due to the existence of prescription drug insurance coverage.
Indeed, I found larger welfare eﬀects in the antidepressant market than in the traditional, full infor-
mation model, suggesting that the market is less competitive than expected. Finally, informative
advertising exacerbates moral hazard and in the presence of prescription insurance, combined with
high incomes, demand for antidepressants becomes very inelastic.
For demand estimation, I use a simulated method of moments algorithm since demand ag-
gregation involves the computation of multi-dimensional integrals for which there is no analytical
solution. The estimated demand parameters provide marginal utilities or disutilities of drug side
eﬀects and help compute own- and cross-price and advertising elasticities of demand (with full and
limited information), which describe patient substitution patterns. To estimate welfare gains from
a new drug, I calculate the upper bound for the average patient surplus when all welfare gains at
the time of introduction are attributed to that innovation. I then compute a lower bound when
the new drug is excluded from the choice set at the time of innovation. The latter is a closer repre-
sentation of the true welfare gains due to innovation. Gains per average daily dosage help evaluate
the patients’ willingness-to-pay in excess of the price charged. Annual prescription gains represent
the additional amount patients are willing to forgo in a year in order to aﬀord each drug. Relative
5Erdem and Keane (1996), Anand and Shachar (2010), Ackerberg (2001, 2003), Shum (2004).
3gains help evaluate the importance and success of diﬀerent innovations in the antidepressant mar-
ket. Finally, comparing diﬀerent models of full and limited information, I show that promotional
eﬀorts by pharmaceutical ﬁrms lead to increases in patient welfare and at the same time increases
in the moral hazard gap.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II analyzes the characteristics of
the market for antidepressants and the pertinent characteristics of the pharmaceutical industry.
Section III discusses the data. Section IV presents the empirical methodology in estimating a
limited information random coeﬃcients multinomial logit model for antidepressants. The results
are presented and discussed in Section V. Section VI uses the demand estimation results to infer
welfare implications of the varied promotional activity by pharmaceutical ﬁrms in antidepressants.
Section VII concludes.
II MARKET BACKGROUND
The pharmaceutical industry is characterized by an impressive stream of new products, especially
over the latter half of the twentieth century, due to rigorous research and development.6 In fact, the
pharmaceutical industry is the most research-intensive U.S. manufacturing industry. The patent
system is in place to ensure that there is suﬃcient incentive for innovation to take place and
that the high costs of research and development can be recouped. As Table I shows research and
development expenditure for the industry increased from $1.5 billion in 1980 to $40 billion in 2008.
INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE
During the life of the patent, the innovator ﬁrm has a legal monopoly on the sale of a particular
drug. Following the expiration of a patent, generic competitors may enter the market following
FDA approval. To obtain this approval, a generic manufacturer must demonstrate that its product
is biologically equivalent to the innovator drug.7 Prior to patent expiration and the advent of
generic competition, an innovator drug may experience competition from pre-existing or new drugs
of diﬀerent chemical make-up and which oﬀer a therapeutic substitute in the treatment of the
6Scherer (2010) presents in detail the workings of the pharmaceutical industry.
7Biological or therapeutic equivalence means a drug acts on the body with the same strength and similar bioavail-
ability as the same dosage of a sample of another drug of the same active ingredient when the route of administration
is the same.
4relevant condition. The latter could be me-too entry, that is, the new drug ﬁghts the disease in a
manner copied from and closely similar to that of the rival. This would categorize drugs as being
of the same ‘type’.8
Estimating the demand for pharmaceutical products is challenging for two reasons. First, most
pharmaceutical products in the United States must be prescribed by a physician. This implies that
a third party makes the product choice most of the time. Second, most patients have some sort of
insurance that may or may not include drug-reimbursement, and may or may not cover all drugs in
the choice set. Moreover, the demand for pharmaceuticals is highly price-insensitive, and the more
acute the illness the higher the insensitivity. The insensitivity is exacerbated by higher income and
by insurance coverage.
Another unique industry characteristic is the unusually vigorous advertising and varied pro-
motional activity. Spurred by product novelty, trademarking, and the diﬃculty consumers and
prescribing physicians have in becoming informed about the eﬃcacy of drug products, expendi-
ture on promotional activities for pharmaceutical products ranks high among industries for both
prescription and over-the-counter drugs. As reported in Table I, advertising expenditure has been
in an upward trend since 1980 but has been in decline recently reaching a total of $39 billion in
2008 ranking second to the automotive industry. Advertising as a percentage of sales has also been
declining in the 2000s dropping from a 6.9% advertising-to-sales ratio in 2000 to 4.2% in 2008.
Similarly, advertising-to-margin ratios have been declining dropping from 9.5% in 2000 to 5.5% in
2008. The picture for pharmaceutical sales is diﬀerent, still in an upward trend starting at $32.1
billion in 1980 and reaching $928 billion in 2008 an almost 30-fold rise.
Advertising in pharmaceuticals can be directed towards physicians, in the form of sales repre-
sentative detailing, professional journal advertising and samples, or towards patients, also know as
direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising. Detailing is when a sales representative of a manufacturer of
drugs calls on oﬃce-based physicians, hospital-based physicians, directors of pharmacies, and other
professional distributors to promote new drugs. It is reportedly the primary information source
to 57 percent of physicians; 85 percent give the process a “strong vote of conﬁdence,” because of
8Me-too entry into the market can also be by trademarked drugs of the same chemical entity as the innovator
drug that nevertheless diﬀer in the type of administration, in strength, and might specialize in attacking speciﬁc
symptoms of the disease.
5the valuable information it provides.9 However, in terms of total advertising spending, detailing
ranks second to samples, as shown in Table I. In the 2000s, it has decreased as a proportion of
total advertising, to 17%, and a total of $6.5 billion by 2008. Professional journal advertising
reﬂects advertising expenditures for prescription drugs appearing in medical journals. It is the
lowest spender among the advertising methods. Though it has dropped to 1% of total advertising
spending by 2008, it has not changed in value ($0.4 billion) Samples are prescription drugs given
to physicians to disseminate freely to patients. These are reported in Table I in terms of their
retail value, factoring in the opportunity cost of the ﬁrms that give them up. However, this may
be upsetting the reported percentages of total advertising spending. In fact, samples have climbed
to 71% of total spending by 2008. It is possible that the rising drug prices as is evident also from
the steep increases in sales revenues, are causing this.
INSERT TABLE II ABOUT HERE
Direct-to-consumer advertising includes advertising for prescription drugs on television, radio,
magazines and newspapers, as well as internet and outdoor advertising. DTC advertising, though
in existence before 1997, it has increased rapidly ever since the law was relaxed to allow prescription
drug advertising direclty to consumers. As reported in Table I, DTC advertising climbed to 16%
of total advertising by 2000 and dropped to 11.3% by 2008, though in value terms it has increased
from $4.2 to $4.4 billion. Table II reports the breakout of DTC advertising into the diﬀerent media
over time. Television holds the largest portion with 63.6% of total spending on media in 2008, a
drop from 66.3% in 1995; print advertising has increased from 29.6% in 1995 to 30.9% in 2008;
radio and outdoor advertising have both decreased from 0.7% and 3.6% in 1995 to 0.3% and 2%
in 2008, respectively. The internet has only been used as a medium since the early 2000s, and
even though it accounts for the decreases in other media, it has also seen a drop relative to 2005,
standing at 3.2% in 2008.
INSERT TABLE III ABOUT HERE
Table III reports similar results to Table II on media breakout but for the top 10 ﬁrms in
the pharmaceutical industry. Total advertising is heavily concentrated among the top 10 phar-
maceutical ﬁrms. It increased from 53.3% in 1995 to 62.7% in 2000 and dropped to 40.9% in
9Scherer, F. M. (2010).
62005. Television advertising is the biggest spender among the diﬀerent media for the top 10 ﬁrms
throughout the years, but has dropped from 78.4% in 1995 to 65.5% in 2005.10 Print advertising is
second, and has similarly been on the rise: from 21.6% in 1995, top 10 ﬁrms accounted for 29.6%
of total print advertising in 2005. The rest is spent on the internet, outdoor and radio advertising.
There is a rise in the latter, which is more evident when we look at individual ﬁrms. Most of the
increase is due to rising internet advertising, where besides improvements in technology and the
ease it oﬀers, the need for anonymity has driven a lot of patients to ﬁll their prescriptions online.
i The Market for Antidepressant Drugs11
I concentrate on the market for antidepressants that includes prescription drugs12 that are FDA-
approved to be used in the pharmacological treatment of clinical depression. I take the antide-
pressant class as described by IMS Health Inc., USC codes 64300-64399. Treatment of depression
does not require combinations of drugs from diﬀerent categories and antidepressants are not used
to treat diseases other than depression, thus elimintating market interaction that would complicate
modeling demand.
Antidepressant drugs are used in the pharmacological treatment of clinical depression, a highly
prevalent disease with a lifetime and annual prevalence of 17% and 10%, respectively.13 Approxi-
mately ﬁfty percent of Americans suﬀering from major depression seek professional care during a
year and of those only about half go to psychiatrists.14 Under-diagnosis and under-treatment may
be due to various causes: Patients may not link their symptoms to a disease; public comprehension
of mental diseases is generally poor; depression still constitutes a social stigma and primary care
physicians miss diagnosing depression half of the time.15 The lack of information is evidenlty key
in this market and research on informative advertising in antidepressants becomes very important.
There currently exists no deﬁnitive biological test for the diagnosis of depression. Consequently,
the psychiatrist diagnoses depression with only the symptoms of a patient, the patient’s medical
10Note that in 2000, the data reported TV and radio together, but in 2005 TV was reported independently and
radio was grouped together with outdoor and internet advertising. Therefore, though, we observe a decrease in the
proportion of TV advertising, the decrease is less than what is reported in the table.
11Cleanthous (2003) describes the market for antidepressants in full detail.
12There are no over-the-counter antidepressants.
13National Comorbidity Survey with data updated as of July 19, 2007.
14Miranda (1994), Badamgarav et al (2003).
15Salmans (1997), Badamgarav et al (2003).
7history and the medical history of the patient’s family, since depression is believed to be genetic.
Symptomatology of depressed patients is idiosyncratic.
A therapeutic subdivision also involves categorizing drugs into types according to the way they
act in curing a disease (mechanism of action). There exist 7 main types of antidepressant drugs,
for example, Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRI). Types are further subdivided into
collections of drugs with the same molecule (active ingredient), for example, ﬂuoxetine (generic),
Prozac, Sarafem, Prozac Weekly. The ﬁrst two antidepressants were introduced in the late 1950s.
Expansion in the market continued steadily with the introduction of new drugs, molecules and
types. With the entry of the ﬁrst SSRI, ﬂuoxetine (Prozac) in 1988, unprecedented media attention
proclaimed Prozac “a wonder drug,” due to the marketing eﬀorts of Lilly and its less severe side
eﬀects.
Treatments other than the pharmacological treatment of depression using antidepressants will
be collectively referred to as the outside option. This option also includes the possibility of no
treatment at all. Once a decision has been made in favor of a pharmacological treatment for de-
pression using antidepressant medication then the choice is one among the available antidepressants
at the time of choice. Table IV lists a combination of all the possible choices in antidepressants that
appeared at least once over the 22-year period of the dataset used. The table divides the antidepres-
sant medications into their diﬀerent types and molecules. For instance, a choice of a speciﬁcd r u g
among Prozac, Sarafem, Prozac Weekly or the generic alternative presupposes a choice of molecule,
in this case Fluoxetine Hydrochloride, which in turn presupposes a choice of type of antidepressant
medication, here SSRI. Note that the choice in antidepressants should be viewed as simultaneous
rather than hierarchical. The divisions into groups are market segmentation characteristics and
help the choice maker in matching tastes and preferences to drug characteristics.
INSERT TABLE IV ABOUT HERE
Historical evidence indicates that no one antidepressant is clearly more eﬀective than another
in achieving the desired health outcome.16 A major source of diﬀerentiation, therefore, is the
mechanism of action of an antidepressant as this is identiﬁed by a drug’s type. Another major
source of diﬀerentiation is an antidepressant’s side eﬀect proﬁle that is common to drugs of the
16Depression Guideline Panel (1993).
8same active ingredient (molecule).
In most industries consumers choose the product, the quantity and the method of payment. In
the case of prescription drugs the decision is shared by the patient, the physician and sometimes
the prescription drug coverage provider. If a patient were left alone to make a decision, she would
base that decision on the expected health outcome of a treatment and the cost of the treatment
net of any insurance co-payment. A patient’s expectation on a health outcome depends on her
information about the treatment, which in turn depends on factors like health awareness, direct-
to-consumer advertising, word-of-mouth, personal experience with antidepressants or medication
for symptomatically similar diseases. However, legislation prevents and protects the patient from
making an uninformed decision by requiring that a prescribing physician makes the treatment
choice. The patient, therefore, can only participate in the optimization of her utility by trying to
aﬀect the physician’s preferences. It is reasonable to assume that drug-prescribing physicians care
about their patients and, thus, try to maximize their patients’ utility.
In the case of depression, patients are highly heterogeneous in their response to treatment,
hence, experience with other patients should only inﬂuence a physician’s decision initially. For the
same reason, existing protocols and guidelines for the treatment of depression are merely suggestive
in nature.17 What is more, existing formularies18 only make a distinction between branded and
generic antidepressants and not across types and molecules. The initial choice of an antidepressant
type and molecule is based on the patient’s own or her family’s medical history. In the absence
of a medical history, physicians start an experimentation phase; often, a physician will begin with
antidepressants with the least overall side eﬀects: some SSRI, TCA. Therapeutic eﬀects appear
within two to six weeks. Treatment of depression typically takes much longer. It may vary from
af e wy e a r si nt h ec a s e so fm i l dd e p r e s s i o nt oap e r son’s life span. This implies that a patient’s
initial experimentation phase is short-lived and will not aﬀect the long-term market shares in
antidepressants. The brevity of the experimentation phase (six months on average) as compared
to total treatment time justiﬁes that annual data captures all learning.
Scientists do not currently have deﬁnitive biological tests that can be administered to humans
to predict exact response to a particular treatment. Prescribing physicians have to rely on their
17Depression Guideline Panel (1993).
18The Lewin Group (2000).
9patients to ﬁnd out whether a certain pharmacological treatment is working out or not. As a
result, patients inﬂuence the physician’s choice in antidepressants. Moreover, it is highly unlikely
that a physician would change types of antidepressants during the continuation phase of a treatment
for price considerations due to the diﬀerence in the way diﬀerent-type drugs are believed to ﬁght
depression.
The major eﬀect of price in the case of antidepressants is in the choice between branded and
generic drugs, where the diﬀerence in price is more pronounced. Interviews with physicians have
revealed that in most cases a physician would prescribe a molecule, not a speciﬁc drug, especially
when the generic is available. A physician would consider choosing the branded drug if the patient
asks him to. With a molecule prescription, a patient could choose to buy the branded version at
the pharmacy. Since all antidepressant drugs of the same molecule are bioequivalent they should
be perfect substitutes in demand. The data show otherwise. This is because patients tend to
perceive the physically identical branded and generic drugs as diﬀerent in quality. The decision to
buy brand over generic is inﬂuenced by the patient’s perception of quality and the price diﬀerence
(after insurance) between two drugs. This is exacerbated by DTC advertising.
Table I reports antidepressant sales and advertising trends over time. Similarly to the rest of
the pharmaceutical industry, advertising-to-sales ratios in antidepressants have been steadily rising,
reaching 9.7% in 2000 and dropping to 8.1% in 2005. Sales and advertising expenditures have been
on the rise reaching $12.5 and $1.02 billion, respectively, in 2008. Regarding the diﬀerent channels
of advertising, the antidepressant market resembles the rest of the pharmaceutical industry when we
look at trends over time, however, in absolute terms detailing and journal advertising are relatively
more important than samples and DTC in antidepressants than in the rest of the industry.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
The evolution of DTC advertising in total spending and by medium is depicted in Figure 1.
The graph shows a clear increase in all channels of advertising, apart from journal advertising. Two
important kinks in the graph are in 1988 and 1997. Prozac was introduced in the market in 1988
and acted as a catalyst to the new era of advertising in pharmaceuticals. Being a new drug, new
molecule and new mechanism of action, it was necessary for Eli Lilly to inform physicians about
the ‘wonder’ drug and the way it tackles the disease in the brain. At the same time, the company
10tried to inform patients about the drug and the disease through provision of free samples, but
also through popular press releases and popular literature. In 1997, with the relaxation of laws
on DTC advertising regarding prescription drugs, spending on DTC advertising increased and has
been steadily on the rise. It is also evident from the graph, that most advertising expenditure in
antidepressants goes into samples. Detailing is secondary in importance but also quite large and
rising. DTC is also on the rise but still premature for the span of the dataset.
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Figure 2 analyzes the evolution of DTC advertising alone, in antidepressants, and separates
drugs into pre-2001 market entry, therefore, included in this paper’s estimation and post-2001
market entry, the newer antidepressants.19 Two trends are evident. First, DTC advertising climbs
high very fast and suddently drops. This is mostly evident in 2002 for older drugs, the year Prozac
went oﬀ patent and there was generic introduction of its molecule, ﬂuoxetine; for newer drugs,
this is mostly evident in 2005. What is happening is that DTC advertising is used to inform
patientss about the drug in order to include it in their choice set. When the drug is oﬀ patent,
DTC advertising can no longer be eﬀective and is no longer advertised to consumers. However,
DTC advertising reduces much earlier than patent expiration. This agrees with the informative
nature of DTC advertising. Firms use it to inform consumers about the existence of the drug and
the disease. Once the drug enters consumers’ information sets, patients will inform their physician
about the drug, in case the physician fails to suggest it. There is no need for DTC advertising when
most consumers have been exposed to the advertisement, unless there is a persuasive role, not so
evident in the case of antidepressants. Second, DTC advertising follows a normal distribution over
time for older drugs. This is due to the fact that ﬁrms spend to advertise their new drugs up until
the point they go oﬀ-patent and generic introduction ensues. In fact, as mentioned above, DTC
spending decreases sharply much before patent expiration. As all older drugs have been introduced
before 2001, a large proportion of these drugs have gone oﬀ-patent by the year 2009, and for the
rest, the informative role of the advertising diminishes.
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
19Data on DTC advertising are monthly and are available upto the ﬁrst quarter of 2010. However, these data
cannot be used post-2001 since we lack data on quantity sales, revenues and other advertising media post-2001.
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case in the rest of the pharmaceutical industry there is an upward trend in television advertising.
The only drop is in 2005, which is characterized by the end of many older campaings and start of
many new drug campaigns. Print advertising follows a wavy, yet slightly upward pattern as well.
Internet advertising is mostly going up, as is the case in all of the industry.
III DATA
Data are for the pharmaceutical preparations industry (SIC 2834) and include market shares,
advertising and prices, drug characteristics (physical or otherwise) and distribution on patient
demographics. Antidepressant sales and advertising data come from IMS Health Inc. and are
complete unlike data on other therapeutic areas. Sales data are national data on quantities and
prices for each antidepressant drug reported on an annual basis: Quantities are in extended units
(adjusted by preparation); prices are wholesale and are aggregated by drug. All values are deﬂated
using the Consumer Price Index of the Bureau of Labor Statistics with 1980 as the base year.
Data for advertising expenses20 and their breakout into diﬀerent channels and media, in the
case of DTC advertising, come from IMS Health Inc., Integrated Promotional Service, Competitive
Media Reporting, the Strategy dataset of Kantar Media, LNA and Schonfeld & Associates via
Advertising Age. Direct-to-physician advertising data consist of professional journal advertising,
sales representative detailing and the samples. The former is reported as total expenditure; detailing
is reported as the total number of contacts wth physicians, the total number of minutes spent during
contacts, and the total cost; ﬁnally, the retail value of samples is reported. For direct-to-consumer
advertising, the total value is reported as well as, spending by medium:21 Sunday, local, and
Spanish-language magazines; national and Spanish-language newspapers; network, national spot
and local television; cable networks; internet; outdoor and radio. In order to cover the whole span
of the available data, DTC advertising was regroupped into three bigger categories: television, print
and internet, radio and outdoor expenditures.
Data run for 22 years from 1980 to 2001. In this period the market for antidepressants includes
20They exclude promotion spending for professional meetings and events.
21Data are for the ‘medicines & proprietary remedies’ category (aggregated from TNS classiﬁcations) by LNA,
which include pharmaceutical houses, medicines & proprietary remedies, ﬁtness, eye glasses, medical equipment.
As this is a diﬀerent categorization than ‘pharmaceutical preparations’, SIC code 2834, aggregate pharmaceutical
industry results may diﬀer in some tables.
12a total of 47 drugs, which are sub-divided into 24 molecules. These are in turn grouped into 7 types
of antidepressants according to their mechanism of action. These constitute market-segmentation
characteristics, as does the distinction between branded and generic drugs. Model estimation uses
dummy variables to account for these. 28 antidepressant innovations took place from 1980 to 2001,
12 of which were molecular innovations of diﬀerent types, both branded and generic. Drug observed
characteristics include side eﬀects, a drug’s half-life, market and revenue shares and they come from
the Drug Information Handbook, Physician’s Desk Reference, Depression Guideline Panel and the
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-
IV). Side eﬀects included separately in the estimation at certain speciﬁcations are the drug’s fatality
rate, weight gain of more than 6 kilograms, and insomnia and/or agitation. The rest of the side
eﬀects are averaged together in one variable. ‘Side eﬀects (5)’ includes anticholinergic, drowsiness,
orthostatic hypotension, cardiac arrhythmias, and gastrointestinal distress eﬀects; ‘side eﬀects (6)’
includes in addition insomnia and/or agitation; ‘side eﬀects (8)’ includes all. Side eﬀects are rated
between 0 and 4+, that is, a range from absent (or rare) to very common side eﬀects. These
rates are averaged over individuals, dosage regimens and bioavailability (half life). Finally, the
data include information on market segmentation characteristics. Media exposure data linked to
purchases come from a match between ACNielsen Homescan(R) Rx/OTC Consumer Panel and
Nielsen Media Research. In the former patient demographics are matched to purchases and the
latter collects data on media habits and demographics.
Demographic data are available for the 22-year span. Income and population data are taken
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Current Population Survey whereas prescription
drug insurance data were provided by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention of the Na-
tional Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), speciﬁcally, combined data on income and out-of-pocket
prescription drug expenditures,22 which helped construct the joint distribution of income and pre-
scription drug insurance. These data are important for allowing patient heterogeneity in prices and
preference for branded drugs.
T h em a r k e ts i z ei sa s s u m e dt ob et h en u m b e ro fp o s s i b l ec o n s u m e r si nt h ea n t i d e p r e s s a n t
market, speciﬁcally, the portion of the population that is estimated to be clinically depressed.23
22Prescription drug expenditures net of any prescription drug insurance coverage (private or public).
23Studies show that the portion of the clinically depressed population that actually seeks medical assistance is
about half the portion of the population that is estimated to be clinically depressed. What is more, people who do
13Time-varying data on the prevalence of clinical depression from the National Comorbidity Study is
used to construct the annual market size and the correct market shares. This procedure is salient
in estimating the correct welfare eﬀects.
IV EMPIRICAL MODEL
I employ a structural estimation strategy24 whereby I specify a model of patient choice with limited
information just as in Sovinsky Goeree (2008) and derive the implied relationships among choice
probabilities. The model is solved using data on price, quantity and other observed drug character-
istics, data on patient and physician preferences, data on advertising quantities and expenditures
across media, micro-level data linking patients to media and to the drugs they purchase, and the
notion of equilibrium.
I model demand for antidepressant drugs as demand for their characteristics, where each drug
is deﬁned as a set of characteristics. Patients are modeled as having heterogeneous tastes, plac-
ing diﬀerent utility weights on these characteristics. In the case of antidepressants, each patient
only consumes one antidepressant at a time. Therefore, patient choice in antidepressants is best
described by a discrete choice model of demand at the patient level where the key assumption is
that each patient buys at most one unit of the good. The full random coeﬃcient logit model allows
for patient heterogeneity using both a multivariate normal distribution and demographic data on
prescription drug insurance and income.
A utility maximizing patient i,w h e r ei =1 ,...,I,i nag i v e nt i m ep e r i o dt,w h e r et =1 ,...,T,
faces Jt +1alternatives: Jt diﬀerent antidepressant drugs and the option of not purchasing any of
the drugs, the outside option, j =0 .A te v e r yt i m ep e r i o dt, each patient maximizes her level of
indirect utility as follows:
max
j∈{0,1,...Jt}
uijt = δjt + μijt +  ijt, (1)
where δj ≡ αpj + x0
jβ + ξj is the mean utility level, a drug-speciﬁc term common to all patients.
The β are the marginal utilities of the drug’s observed characteristics, xj,t h eα is the marginal
not seek medical assistance are not always consciously doing so. They can be unaware of the fact that depression is
not merely a mood but rather a debilitating disease and tend to ignore depressive symptoms altogether. Since doctors
depend on their patients to conﬁrm the existence of symptoms, people who are not clinically depressed may seek
to purchase antidepressants for various other reasons like the treatment of mild anxiety disorders or entertainment.
Information on the latter two cases is not widely available but I assume their net eﬀect to be small.
24The model builds on BLP (1995), Petrin (2002), Cleanthous (2003).
14disutility associated with price, pj and ξj are drug characteristics unobservable to the researcher.
Note that this formulation of utility speciﬁes that the unobserved characteristic is identical for all
patients. By letting the price coeﬃcient vary across patients in the full random coeﬃcients model
the ξj captures the elements of vertical product diﬀerentiation in the antidepressant market. The
term μijt captures the heterogeneity in patient preferences for observed (by the econometrician)
drug characteristics and  ijt is a mean zero random utility component distributed i.i.d. type I
extreme value across both drugs and patients. The sum of the latter two components represents
the deviation from the mean utility level for each patient i and is a measure of the idiosyncratic
valuation of drug j’s characteristics.
i Demand Model Including Information on Patient Heterogeneity
In the random coeﬃcients logit (RCL) patient heterogeneity in preferences will be captured. A
patient’s substitution to a new drug due to an increase in the price of the initial drug chosen will
depend on the attributes of her initial choice, her income and her prescription drug coverage. As
already mentioned, the model will be estimated, ﬁrst, by assuming a multivariate normal distribu-
tion of patient tastes. Then, more precise estimates will be obtained by using information on the
distribution of patient preferences as it relates to some of the drug characteristics. The beneﬁto f
this methodology is that it does not require observations on patient purchase decisions to estimate
the demand parameters. The use of demographics provide ample information on patients’ substi-
tution patterns and, hence, estimates of the parameters of the distribution of patient preferences
are precise.
In the absence of patient-level data, I use aggregate-level information that relate average patient
demographics to some of the drug characteristics. Individual patient characteristics are modeled as a
combination of an observed component (patient demographics), Di, and an unobserved component,
τi assumed to be independent. This allows the inclusion of information about the distribution of
the marginal disutilities of price and the preference for branded drugs obtained from demographic
data.
Combining the demand parameters in δjt and μijt the overall eﬀect of observed characteristics














τ (.) is a parametric distribution that has a standard multivariate normal distribution,
and P∗
D (.) a non-parametric distribution derived from the data. Π is a matrix of coeﬃcients that
measure the relation between demographics and patient preferences and Λ is a matrix of parameters.
Hence, Λ allows a diﬀerent variance for each component of τi and a correlation among these patient
preferences. The utility can now be rewritten as follows:
uijt = δjt + μijt +  ijt (3)
where δjt = αpjt + x0
jtβ + ξjt,μ ijt =[ pjt,x jt] ∗ (ΠDit + Λτit)
and the probability that a patient chooses drug j at time t as expressed in equation can now
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k∈Jt exp(δkt + μikt)
. (4)
where sijt represents the probability that patient type i will purchase drug j at time t. The price




























Each patient type has a diﬀerent price sensitivity and this varies by drug. The weighted average
of this sensitivity is calculated using as weights the patient-speciﬁc purchase probabilities. Own and
cross-price elasticities of demand are not just the result of the logit function and cross-elasticities
are larger for products that are closer in terms of their characteristics.
16ii Incorporating Consumer Awareness
I now allow for the purchase probability of each patient i to also depend on her awareness of
each drug j and, consequently, on her awareness of drugs that are competing against j.W h e n a
patient becomes aware of the existence of a drug, the drug enters her choice set. Given her choice
set, the patient then buys the product, or not, exactly as in the previous analysis. The implicit
assumption is that pharmaceutical advertising alerts the patient to the drug’s existence, directly or
via a physician, and thereby increases the probability that the drug enters the patient’s choice set.
Let Cj be the set of all possible choice sets that include drug j and let φijt be the probability that
patient i is informed about drug j at time period t. The information component, φijt, describes the
eﬀectiveness of advertising at informing patients and physicians about drugs. Assuming patients
are aware of the outside option with probability one, and given all assumptions mentioned above,
















r∈S exp(δrt + μirt)
. (6)
The outside sum is over all the diﬀerent choice sets that include drug j. Advertising aﬀects demand
through the awareness function φijt, which describes the eﬀectiveness of advertising at informing the
choice makers. The awareness is modeled as a function of drug j’s advertising by medium, observed
drug characteristics, and unobserved idiosyncratic patient-advertising-medium-speciﬁce ﬀects. The


















itζ + κi)+f D0itλ, lnκi ˜ N (0,I m)
where θφ =( λ,ϕ,ρ,ζ). The advertisements for drug j are grouped under the diﬀerent direct-to-
consumer and direct-to-physician advertising methods and are represented by the m-dimensional
vector, αjt.T h ee d-dimensional vector λ measures the fraction of patients of type e Di who are in-
formed without seeing any advertising, a subset of observed patient characteristics D25; ϕ measures
25It consists of data such as a constant, dummy variables for prescription drug insurance coverage and various
17advertising eﬀectiveness; ρ captures the decreasing or increasing eﬀectiveness of advertising. To-
gether ϕ and ρ capture how variation in advertising eﬀe c t i v e n e s sv a r i e sa c r o s sd r u g s . ϑ captures
the eﬀect of a drug’s age (patients may know a drug the longer it has been on the market) and
ψ captures the decreasing or increasing eﬀect of age; the hypothesis is that when a drug is too
old, then the informational eﬀect of age is decreasing. Υ captures how advertising media’s eﬀec-
tiveness varies by observed patient characteristics. I estimate the parameters of the Υ ﬁrst using
the Nielsen data. I use these estimates in the model and estimate the other parameters matching
observed market shares to predicted shares as in BLP. Therefore, ΥDn
i is the exposure of patient i
to medium m,a n dα0
jΥDn
i i st h ee x p o s u r eo fi to advertisements for drug j: ζ measures the eﬀect of
this ad exposure on the information set. The matrix Πm×d will now capture how advertising media
eﬀectiveness varies by observed patient characteristics Dn. The stochastic patient-medium-speciﬁc
term κim represents additional unobserved patient heterogeneity with regard to advertising medium
eﬀectiveness. These include patient attributes that may inﬂuence the eﬀectiveness of medium m
at informing the patient, but that are not uncovered by observed demographic characteristics. I
assume κ is independent of other unobservables.
As advertising increases, the awareness function approaches one but it is non-zero even for zero
advertisements since some patients are informed even if there is no advertising. The magnitude
of the probability that a patient is informed when no advertising occurs is determined by f D0itλ.
Patients may get informed through word-of-mouth or the internet, for instance; physicians may
become aware about the existence of new drugs by reading articles in medical journals or interacting
with other physicians at conferences.26
The conditional probability that i purchases j, sij ,i sn o wg i v e ni n(6).M a r k e t s h a r e i s a
function of prices and advertising of all drugs. The smaller the φij, the smaller the drug market
share. If φij were equal to one for all drugs, market share would be the standard full information
choice probability. Demand for j at time t is Mtsjt,w h e r eMt i st h em a r k e ts i z eg i v e nb yt h ep o r t i o n
income groups.
26Notice φij depends upon own drug advertising only. I assume the probability a patient is informed about a
drug, conditional on her attributes, is independent of the probability she is informed about any other drug, that is,
information provided through advertising for one drug cannot spillover to another drug. This is an oversimplifying
assumption, especially in pahrmaceuticals were advertising of the disease is common. Howerer, allowing informational
spillovers would greatly complicate the model: ﬁrst, the theoretical framework would have to address free-riding in
advertising choices across ﬁrms and, second, one would need adequate variation in the data to empirically identify
the spillover eﬀect across drugs.
18of the U.S. population that is estimated to be clinically depressed, which is directly observed.
iii Identiﬁcation
I treat media exposure as exogenous to the purchase decision. To the extent that media exposure is
endogenous the estimate of v in the information component will be overstated. Associated with each
drug is a mean utility, which is chosen to match observed and predicted market shares. If patients
were identical, then all variation in sales would be driven by variation in drug characteristics.
Variation in market shares corresponding to variation in the observablr characteristics of those
drugs (such as insomnia) is used to identify the parameters of mean utility (β).
While a drug may have characteristics that are preferred by many patients (high β’s), it may also
have characteristics that appeal to certain types of patients. Identiﬁcation of the taste distribution
parameters relies on information on how patients substitute. First, new drug introductions are
common in the pharmaceutical industry. Variation of this sort is helpful for identiﬁcation of Λ.
The distribution of unobserved tastes, νi,i sﬁxed over time, but the choice set of available drugs
is changing over time. Variation in sales patterns over time as the choice sets change allows for
identiﬁcation of Λ. Second, I augment the market level data with micro data on drug choice. The
extra information in the micro data allows variation in choices to mirror variation in tastes for
product attributes. Correlation between xjDi and choices identiﬁes the Π parameters.
If patients were identical, then all variation in the information component, and induced variation
in shares, would be driven by variation in advertising or the age of the drug. Variation in sales
corresponding to variation in drug age identiﬁes γ. Variation in sales corresponding to variation in
advertising identiﬁes the other parameters of γj . Returns to scale in media advertising (ρm)a r e
identiﬁed by covariation in sales with the second derivative of ajm.
One major drawback of aggregate advertising data is that I do not observe variation across
patients. Normally observed variation in market shares corresponding to variation in household
advertising media exposure would be necessary to identify Y and ν. The individual-level data con-
tain useful information on media exposure across households. Variation in choices of media exposure
corresponding to variation in observable consumer characteristics (Dn
i ) identiﬁes Y . Variation in
sales and ad exposure (a0
jYD n
i ) identiﬁes the eﬀect of advertising exposure on the information
set (ν). Thus, the data allow me to side-step the need for observed advertising variation across
19households. The other parameters of λij which do not interact with advertising (λ) are separately
identiﬁed from Π due to nonlinearities.
V ESTIMATION AND RESULTS
i Descriptive Statistics
Summary statistics on observed drug characteristics are presented in Table V. The reported char-
acteristics show that MAOIs tend to have the most adverse side eﬀect proﬁle including high fatality
rates, whereas newer antidepressants have better side eﬀect proﬁles. It is apparent though that
adverse side eﬀects are lower for SSRIs overall. Depending on patient valuations of these diﬀerent
side eﬀects, some drugs are more favorable than others on average. Due to the idiosyncracy of
patient valuations, it is not possible to say which drug is more eﬃcient for each patient. In other
words, a side eﬀect proﬁle is used by individual patients to make decisions. Additionally, SSRIs
have a closer correlation of side eﬀect occurrence than do drugs in other types. TCAs have the
highest average occurrence in ﬁv eo ft h es i d ee ﬀects and the lowest in two. SSRIs rank exactly
the opposite to TCAs. New Generation antidepressants have the lowest average half-life and in
addition the lowest fatality rates and occurrence of weight gain on average. The latter is shared
with SSRIs.
INSERT TABLE V ABOUT HERE
TCAs controlled most of the market in the beginning of the period in 1980. However, their
share has been steadily dropping ever since, more dramatically for revenues than for quantities.
In 2001 TCAs still account for 14.5% of antidepressant sales, yet they only amass 1.2% of the
revenues. MAOIs have had low revenue and quantity shares over the whole period. The advent of
new generation antidepressants in 1982 is marked by an evident drop in the shares of TCAs and
a negligible drop in the shares of MAOIs. Shares for new generations keep rising until 1988 when
SSRIs enter the market. From then on, these shares ﬂuctuate around the same mean until they
stabilize in the latter half of the 1990s when some of the newer types are introduced (NDRI, SNRI,
NaSSA). Prozac’s introduction swept the market. Since the shares of both new generations and
TCAs dropped, Prozac was seen as a possible substitute for both types of drugs. However, as time
passed only TCA shares kept decreasing. This means that the new SSRIs being introduced were
20no longer viewed as ameliorations to the side eﬀect proﬁles of new generations but were viewed as
better medications than TCAs. This also explains the fact that SSRI revenue shares kept rising
sharply whereas their quantity shares increased at a decreasing rate.
INSERT TABLE VI ABOUT HERE
Consumer Characteristics averaged over the 22 years are presented in Table VI. Whereas costs
covered by prescription drug plans follow a similar trend in the dataset as does income per capita,
overall prescription drug costs rise faster. Average income per patient in 1980 dollars was $11,922
in 1980 and $17,044 in 2001 and prescription drug expenditures per patient in 1980 dollars were
about $53 in 1980 and rose to about $239 in 2001. Out of these expenditures, about 30.6% was
covered by a prescription plan in 1980 and 69.1% in 2001. Respectively, antidepressant expenditures
per patient were $11 in 1980 and $386 in 2001. Insurance coverage for antidepressant medications
changed from 17% in 1980 to 44% in 2001. This is mainly due to the fact that mental health is not
included in some insurance plans. Also, depression is a chronic disease and depressed patients reach
their cap much faster than the average patient. As shown in Table VI, between 1980-2001, 19.6%
of patients were covered by public insurance, such as medicare and medicaid, 34.4% by private
insurance, and 46% had no prescription drug insurance coverage. On average, 2% of the total U.S.
population are on antidepressants over the 22 years.
Table VI shows that sample demographics are very close to actual population demographics
when we average over the years with DTC data. This is because sample data strives to resemble
the U.S. population. Media exposure data show that over the period in question television exposure
was 4.3 hours per person per day; 2.6 hours for radio; 1 hour for newspapers and magazines; and
12 minutes on the internet. Note that the internet picked up only in the late 1990s. Average media
exposure per person per day is 8.2 hours.
ii Estimation
I estimate demand parameters in the full information random coeﬃcients model following the GMM
approach introduced in BLP (1995), extended by Nevo (2000) and adapted for the pharmaceutical
industry by Cleanthous (2003). For the limited information case I use the algorithm introduced
21in Sovinsky Goeree (2008) extending BLP (1995).27 To correct for the above-mentioned price
endogeneity, I need to specify variables that can act as instruments for price in the demand equa-
tions. Variables that are correlated with speciﬁc functions of the observed drug prices, but are
not correlated with the unobserved demand disturbances, ξj, are appropriate instruments. Valid
instruments used are: the number of products in the market at each time period t, Jt;t h en u m b e r
of products of the same type of antidepressants available at each time period t, Jct;t h en u m b e ro f
products of the same molecule available at each time period t, Jmt; the time passed since generic
entry took place in the same molecule.
When a patient makes a decision as to which drug to buy, she has to take into account her income
and insurance status, speciﬁcally, her coverage for pharmaceutical products. Insurance can come
in many types. Coverage can also take many forms within each insurance status. I incorporate
these variables in the patient’s decision process as described by observed demographics. These
are the logarithm of a patient’s income, the logarithm of squared income and insurance dummy
variables simulated from the distribution of out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures. Income
and insurance variables are drawn from the joint distribution provided by NCHS. The random
coeﬃcient model is estimated with and without demographic information and results are compared.
Besides income and insurance, other idiosyncratic variables, unobserved to the econometrician,
may enter a patient’s decision process. The unobserved patient characteristics, τi, are random
draws from a standard normal distribution. Draws are for 2000 individuals per time period. With
the inclusion of insurance data, the estimated eﬀect on utility of the various drug characteristics will
be closer to their true values. Given the ns draws of the observed and unobserved characteristics I
average over the implied logit shares. Simulation draws are held constant as the parameters change
otherwise changes in the objective function would be due to simulation changes.
With an estimated model one can verify whether the estimated parameters carry the expected
signs and from their magnitude infer the relevant signiﬁcance of their role in a patient’s decision
process in choosing to purchase an antidepressant. The price sensitivity, α, is expected to be
negative; it represents the disutility associated with the drug’s price. The side-eﬀect coeﬃcients,
β’s, are also expected to be negative since they are taste parameters to undesirable side eﬀects. A
27See Cleanthous (2003) for details on the full information model and Sovinsky Goeree (2008) for a detailed technical
description of the computation algorithm for the limited information case.
22drug’s half-life is also expected to have a negative coeﬃcient. The lower the coeﬃcient the faster
is takes for the drug to become available at the site of physiological activity after administration.
However, some people dislike small half-lives because they increase the frequency at which they
have to repeat the medication. It is ambiguous, therefore, what sign to expect for the coeﬃcient
of half-life.
In the random coeﬃcient model, additional information is obtained from the inclusion of unob-
served and observed patient characteristics. This model estimates mean eﬀects, the means of the
distribution of marginal utilities (α’s and β’s in equation (2)), by a minimum-distance procedure.
It also estimates standard deviations (Λ in equation (2)) which are estimates of the unobserved
heterogeneity about the mean eﬀects. Finally, it estimates coeﬃcients of demographic interactions
with price and preference for ‘brandness’, that is, estimates of the observed heterogeneity about
the mean eﬀects (Π in equation (2)). To avoid obtaining positive values for price sensitivity in the
tail of the distribution that would imply that the higher the price the higher the utility, I regress
the negative of the logarithm of the αi’s on the observed and unobserved characteristics in equation
(2). This restricts the overall price sensitivity to non-positive values.
iii Demand Estimation
Previous research28 has estimated demand on antidepressants using traditional structural models,
which assume that the choice maker has full information about all available products in the market.
Consumer attributes that matter the most in the case of antidepressant demand are income and
prescription drug insurance coverage. Research on the personal computer industry29 has suggested
that age, education, household size and marital status are signiﬁcant. After various reduced form
checks, I included some of these demographics in the limited information model estimated here.
In the appendix, I estimate diﬀerent models of demand to show that the instruments used in the
full model address the endogeneity issues: the simple logit model and three nested multinomial
logit models, described in the appendix, NML1a, NML1b, NML2. Two versions of each model
were estimated: an OLS version and an IV version correcting for price endogeneity. The results
are presented in Table A.I in the appendix. In the OLS results, estimated price sensitivity is
28Cleanthous (2003, 2009).
29Sovinsky Goeree (2008).
23negative but small and decreases when moving from the logit model to either NML1 models or to
NML2. Price sensitivity increases in the reverse manner in the IV counterparts, which correct for
price endogeneity. This implies that correction for price endogeneity is important and necessary.
When moving from each OLS model to its IV counterpart, estimated price sensitivity more than
quantuples. In fact it is 17 times as big in the NML2 model. The disutility for price was correctly
detected and is high; it ranges from -2.1 to -2.7.
In general, statistical signiﬁcance in coeﬃcients increases when moving from the OLS logit
models rightward and up to the NML2 model. This means that market segmentation, and the
additional structure it imposes in NML1 and NML2, improves on the model’s prediction. The
magnitude and direction of the coeﬃcients of product characteristics is of the right order. The low
and sometimes insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients are reason to favor the full random coeﬃcient model which
places no restriction on the correlation between antidepressants. The observed high signiﬁcance of
most of the estimated random coeﬃcients leads Wald tests to favor the random coeﬃcient models
(both with and without demographics) over the more restrictive speciﬁcations of the models in
Table A.I.
The model that oﬀers the best estimates in Table A.I is NML2. I, therefore, use this model to
test 3 diﬀerent speciﬁcations that use diﬀerent aggregations of the side eﬀects variable. Results are
presented in Table A.II in the appendix. In speciﬁcation (1) I use ‘side eﬀects (5)’, fatality, weight
gain and insomnia/agitationg; in speciﬁcation (2) I use ‘side eﬀects (6)’, fatality and weight gain;
a n di ns p e c i ﬁcation (3), I use ‘side eﬀects (8)’ as explained in section III. Branded drug with(out)
generics are dummies that take the value one for branded drugs where there has (not) been generic
introduction in the respective molecule. In all speciﬁcations, the parameter estimates carry the
expected signs and are similarly signiﬁcant. The instruments appear to address the endogeneity of
price and result in estimates for the price coeﬃc i e n tt h a ta r es i g n i ﬁcantly higher in absolute value.
The ﬁrst-stage F-statistic for the IV regressions are high suggesting the instruments have power.
INSERT TABLE VII ABOUT HERE
Table VII presents the results of the OLS-NML2, IV-NML2 and RCL models together. The
results of the latter are given both when no demographics are used and when demographic informa-
tion is incorporated. Also the RCL models are run with full and with limited information. Columns
243-4 of Table VII show the mean eﬀects, α0sa n dβ0s, of the RCL estimates with no demographics
and columns 5-6 the RCL estimates with demographics. Models in columns 3 and 5 are estimated
in the traditional manner, under the full information assumption, and models in the other four
columns are estimated under the limited information assumption. The standard deviations from
the addition of the unobserved characteristics and estimated parameters from the addition of de-
mographics for the limited information RCL model with demographics are then presented in Table
VIII.
The price coeﬃcient in all models is negative and signiﬁcant as expected. The magnitude of the
coeﬃcient increases a lot when going from the OLS to the IV version of the NML2, indicating the
power of the instruments. In the RCL models, the estimated price coeﬃcients decrease. A decrease
is also observed when we move from the no-demographics models to the corresponding models
with demographics. Finally, a further decrease in the coeﬃcients occurs when we take limited
information into account. Results suggest that limited information about a drug is a contributing
factor to diﬀerences in purchase outcomes and that information is distributed across patients in a
nonrandom way.
The signs of fatality, weight gain and side-eﬀects coeﬃcients are negative as expected and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant for all versions of the model. The magnitude of the fatality rate coeﬃcient
is largest in the full-information-no-demographics version and smallest in the limited-information-
demographics version. Similar results are obtained for the side-eﬀect coeﬃcient. Insomnia/agitation
obtains diﬀerent results: positive signiﬁcant in the NML2 models, negative insigniﬁcant in the no-
demographics RCL models, and negative signiﬁcant in the RCL models with demographics. Sim-
ilarly to the other three side-eﬀect coeﬃcients, the limited information disutilities of insomnia are
smaller in absolute magnitude. It seems that including informational eﬀects in the model mitigates
the disutilities of the adverse side eﬀects. Patients are now using advertising as a determinant for
drug choice and even though adverse side eﬀects still have negative marginal valuations they are
relatively less important now in inﬂuencing consumer choice; information, therefore, does play a
signiﬁcant role in patient choice.
The coeﬃcient on drug’s age also changes sign while moving along the diﬀerent models. With
random or no consumer heterogeneity, age has a positive signiﬁcant eﬀect, that is, patients prefer
drugs that have been on the market for a long time. When demographics are included, I obtain
25the result that is consistent with the data, that newer drugs are preferable to consumers: negative
signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. If older drugs were preferebale (say, they cure a disease) there would be no
incentive for pharmaceutical ﬁrms to innovate. Innovation takes place to cover unmet demand, so
there must be something that new drugs are oﬀering that old existing drugs failed to address. A
side-eﬀect-age interaction eﬀect was included to correct this detected divergence in age coeﬃcients:
it is meant to capture the fact that older drugs are preferred only when they have low side-eﬀects,
which is intuitive. The coeﬃcient is negative and signiﬁcant and outweighs in almost all cases the
positive signiﬁcant eﬀect of age, or increases the disutility that comes with age in the demographics
case. Again, the limited information models obtain smaller coeﬃcients 75% of the time. The
statistical and economic signiﬁcance of this results is analyzed in more detail in the full RCL
model.
Finally, the coeﬃcient on brand preference is of great importance. With an ambiguous expected
direction, it is interesting to observe that estimated coeﬃcients are positive and signiﬁcant, when
a generic does not exist in the same molecule as the brand, and negative signiﬁcant, when a
generic does exist.30 This says that people are not swayed by perceptions that favor branded over
generic drugs when the two are therapeutically equivalent. It is possible that when patients have
insurance plans that fully cover for branded drugs they may opt for brand over generic since they
are indiﬀerent among the two. What should still hold, even in the case of full insurance coverage,
is that branded drugs with generics would be more elastic than branded drugs without. In the
case of no generics, patients could opt for me-too drugs with generics, but the highly signiﬁcant,
positive coeﬃcient shows they do not. Patients, in general, place great value in their health and
would opt for the drug with the highest quality. In pharmaceuticals, ‘brandness’ is a good proxy
for perceived quality. The utility obtained from whether a drug is branded or generic also depends
on an individual’s income and prescription drug insurance coverage. Therefore, the two brandness
coeﬃcients, similarly to the price coeﬃcient, are allowed to vary with demographics in the RCL
model. One more time, comparing the RCL estimates between the full and limited information
models, we observe a decrease in the magnitude of the negative brand eﬀect but an increase in
30In the relevant literature, ‘brandness’ is a dummy in itself. Cleanthous (2009) did not make the distinction
between branded drugs with and without generics and a higly signiﬁcant, positive result was detected, which was
increasing with income and prescription drug insurance. In this model, the eﬀect for brand without generic is much
higher, and signiﬁcant as there is no competition and, in the case of generic competition negative signiﬁcant.
26magnitude in the positive coeﬃcient. Patients still favor brand over competitive generics and with
more intensity when we include informational eﬀects in the model: patients preference for brandness
is reinforced by advertising.Yet patients still opt for generic over brand when the two coexist for
the same molecule.
The observed high signiﬁcance of most of the estimated random coeﬃcients leads Wald tests to
favor the random coeﬃcient models (both with and without demographics) over the more restrictive
speciﬁcations of the logit models. Dummy variables for type and ‘brandness’ are included as
drug characteristics in the RCL model to capture any correlation that may exist. The results are
presented in Table VIII. The mean coeﬃcients of the RCL models without demographics (columns 3
and 4 of Table VII) are economically and statistically signiﬁcant. In the models with demographics,
the price disutility is close to unity for the full information model (column 5) and decreases to below
unity in the limited information model. Estimated standard deviations from the addition of the
unobserved characteristics were mostly insigniﬁcant which means that the normality assumption
for the distribution of the unobserved characteristics is not valid under the limited information
assumption. These results reinforce the need for the use of demographics to correctly model patient
decisions, especially when it comes to the choice of characteristics such as price and brandness.
INSERT TABLE VIII ABOUT HERE
Table VIII presents demand estimation results for the full random coeﬃcients model using
demographic income and prescription drug insurance described above. The model was estimated
using instrumental variables to correct for price endogeneity. The ﬁrst column lists the means of
the distributions of marginal utilities and disutilities, α’s and β’s, of antidepressant characteristics.
T h eo n l ym e a ne ﬀect with an insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient is the side-eﬀect-age interaction. The rest
have signiﬁcant coeﬃcients both statistically and economically. The estimates of the heterogeneity
around these means are presented in the other columns of the table. The second column tests
the standard deviations which are parameters that capture the eﬀect of the unobserved patient
preferences. These eﬀects are half of the times statistically and economically signiﬁcant. The last
three columns present the eﬀects of demographics (observed patient characteristics) on the mean
coeﬃcients. These estimates are almost all statistically and economically signiﬁcant.
All adverse side eﬀects have negative mean coeﬃcients and two have relatively large and in-
27signiﬁcant standard deviations. The negative coeﬃcients suggest that the average patient gets more
disutility the more these side-eﬀects occur. The estimated standard deviations are estimates of the
random patient heterogeneity around these means. Since some of these are relatively large, this
means that some of the adverse eﬀects are not viewed as adverse by some patients in the simulated
sample. There is no immediate explanation behind the insigniﬁcant standard deviations. A pos-
sible explanation for this result is that most depressed people are very similar in their valuation
of these side-eﬀects.The negative coeﬃcient on fatality diﬀers. It has a small but signiﬁcant stan-
dard deviation, thus, all patients have a disutility from this side eﬀect. Though a large negative
coeﬃcient was obtained for insomnia/agitation implying high disutility for the average consumer,
it is interesting to see that a relatively large standard deviation was estimated implying that some
patients obtain positive utility from occurrence of this characteristic.
Half-life has a negative coeﬃcient, but a relatively large and signiﬁcant standard deviation. As
explained before, the expected coeﬃcient on half-life is ambiguous as some people who experience
severe adverse side eﬀects prefer a fast reaction to the medication whereas others, who consider
taking medication often a hassle, prefer a longer half-life. The negative coeﬃcient shows that the
severe side-eﬀects eﬀect won over the hassle eﬀect. This means that, by allowing variability in
patient preferences, patients who experience severe adverse eﬀects and prefer shorter half-lives are
more in the randomly chosen sample. The large standard deviation implies that the coeﬃcient is
positive for many patients, that is the sample includes those patients that consider small half-lives
a hassle as they have to keep remembering to frequently retake their medication. The negative
and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of age, as explained before, is due to the fact that patients
prefer newer more innovative drugs to old antidepressants. The small standard deviation, though
statistically insigniﬁcant, is economically signiﬁcant and shows that for all patients age provides a
disutility.
The parameters of most importance in this ﬁnal model are the coeﬃcients on the preference
of brandness and price sensitivity. As presented in equation (2), given the assumption on the
independence of the distributions of unobserved and observed patient characteristics (that is, τi
and Di are independent), the total price sensitivity is a combination of the mean eﬀects and the
eﬀects prescribed by the interaction with unobserved and observed characteristics. The mean eﬀect
on price is now below unity, −0.872. This is the disutility obtained by the average patient. The
28relatively small estimated standard deviation suggests that most of the heterogeneity (87%) in
patient preferences is explained by the included demographics. In other words, the inclusion of
these observed demographics improved the model’s predictability. Estimates imply that wealthier
patients and patients with prescription drug insurance tend to be less price sensitive. In fact,
when deriving the combined eﬀect of income and insurance on the mean price disutility the total
marginal valuation of price comes closer to zero. When taking the standard deviation from the
unobserved patient characteristics into account as well, one concludes that many patients have
price sensitivities not far from zero.31 This result uncovers the moral hazard problem that arises
due to the presence of prescription drug insurance coverage. The question then becomes one
of distinguishing between a patient’s private marginal willingness-to-pay or the marginal social
willingness-to-pay when estimating welfare.
INSERT TABLE IX ABOUT HERE
The estimates of the coeﬃcients on the preference for brandness (without generic competition)
are all positive as expected. The mean eﬀect is a high positive value and says that the average
patient prefers branded drugs over generics. The marginal valuation of brand preference increases
with income and insurance. This means wealthier patients and patients with prescription insurance
coverage get even more utility from consuming branded drugs over generics. This reinforces the
result of associating brandness to quality. In other words, the coeﬃcient on preference for branded
drugs is a proxy for patient-perceived drug quality. Again, the relatively small estimated standard
deviation suggests that most of the heterogeneity (86%) in patient preference for this brandness is
explained by the observed demographics.
The estimates of the coeﬃcients on the preference for brandness (with generic competition) are
as expected. The mean eﬀect is large, negative and signiﬁcant. The standard deviation is tiny
suggesting that almost all of the heterogeneity (98%) in patient preference for this brandness is
explained by the observed demographics. More importantly, the marginal valuation of this brand
preference increases with income and decreases with insurance. This means wealthier patients get
less disutility from consuming branded drugs over generics when the two coexist in the same mole-
cule. This reinforces the result of associating brandness to quality. In other words, the coeﬃcient on
31Recall that I restricted the model not to allow for positive price sensitivity, even in the tail of the distribution.
This became necessary when making demand-based patient welfare assessments.
29preference for branded drugs is a proxy for patient-perceived drug quality and when income is high
the patient is indiﬀerent and opts for the marginally higher quality of the branded drug. On the
other hand patients with prescription insurance coverage get even more disutility from consuming
branded drugs over generics when the two coexist in the same molecule. Though counterintuitive at
ﬁrst glance, this ﬁnding may be related to the fact that formularies in most insurance schemes cover
only the generic, or at most the generic cost, when that exists. Hence, individuals with insurance
are likely to be conﬁn e di nt h e i rc h o i c e sb yf o r m u l a r i e s .
INSERT TABLE X ABOUT HERE
Tables IX and X show the combined eﬀect of demographics on price and brand sensitivity,
respectively, and compare results for the full information (FIM) and limited information (LIM)
models. Wealthier patients who also have full prescription coverage are almost insensitive to changes
in the price of a drug and have a higher preference for branded drugs (with or without insurance).
Poorer patients without prescription drug coverage are the most sensitive to price changes and
have the lowest preference for brandness (without generic competition) and the highest disutility
for brandness (with generic competition). Moving from the latter extreme case to the former, the
oﬀ diagonal results show that poorer but insured patients are less price sensitive, have a higher
preference for brandness (without generic competition) and lower disutility for brandness (with
generic competition) than do wealthier, uninsured patients. When comparing the two models
together LIM obtains lower price disutilities in all demographic combinations. In the case of
brandness (without generic competition), LIM obtains lower marginal valuations. Finally, in the
case of brandness (with generic competition) LIM obtains lower disutilities for the uninsured and
turns the disutilities into positive utilities in the case of the insured.
Traditional FIM capture all diﬀerences in information through the ξj or the εij,b o t ho fw h i c ha r e
independent across patients. Information heterogeneity indirectly captured by the i.i.d. error will
be restricted such that each patient-drug pair has its own realization that is independent of patient
and drug attributes (such as advertising) and of all other patient-drug pairs. This does not permit
correlation in information across patients nor does it permit informational advantages to depend on
patient and drug observables. Alternatively, information heterogeneity can be indirectly captured
via ξj. In LIM, a product with little advertising is unlikely to be in many patients’ choice sets and
30will have a low market share. In FIM, a small market share could be explained by a low value for
ξj. Again, the unobserved term is independent of patient characteristics. Not explicitly allowing for
informational asymmetries is particularly restrictive in rapidly changing, complex markets where
patients are likely to have limited information, and hence where heterogeneity in the distribution of
i n f o r m a t i o na c r o s sp a t i e n t sa n dd r u g se x p l a i n s( p e r h a p sas i g n i ﬁcant) part of the variation in sales
across products. The results indicate that relying on ξj or εij,t oe x p l a i nd i ﬀerences in information
across patient-drug pairs can generate inconsistent estimates of drug—speciﬁc demand curves that
are biased toward being too elastic.
iv Consumer Information Heterogeneity and Advertising Eﬀectiveness
As expected, results indicate that advertising has very diﬀerent eﬀects across patients and that
exposure to advertising signiﬁcantly impacts the information set. Table XI presents estimates of
how media exposure varies with observed demographic characteristics (Υ). These coeﬃcients proxy
for eﬀectiveness of advertisements in reaching consumers through various media. The results indi-
cate print media (magazines and newspapers) are most eﬀective at reaching high income, insured,
married individuals who are above the age of 34, but are less likely to reach low-educated white
males. It is the most eﬀective medium to reach high-income, fully-insured individuals who also have
the lowest price elasticities. TV advertising is the most eﬀective medium for reaching low income
households and is also eﬀective at reaching married, less-educated individuals over 54, although not
as eﬀective as print media. Most DTC pharmaceutical advertising is on television (63.6% in 2008)
suggesting pharmaceutical ﬁrms target low-income, insured, older individuals, possibly people on
medicare and medicaid. Internet advertising is the most eﬀective medium for reaching high-income
individuals and it has recently been picking up. Perhaps pharmaceutical ﬁrms are trying to catch up
and approach the wealthier, price-insensitive population, who are also very likely at being insured.
INSERT TABLE XI ABOUT HERE
The results conﬁrm that variation in advertising media exposure across households is an im-
portant source of consumer heterogeneity. The variation in exposure translates into variation in
information sets as evidenced by the positive and highly signiﬁcant estimate for ζ. The estimates
highlight the importance of considering the diﬀerential eﬀects of advertising both across households
31and across media. Sovinsky Goeree (2008) was the ﬁrst to do so in a structural empirical industrial
organization setting. Parameter estimates of λ suggest other means of information provision, such
as word-of-mouth or experience, play a role in informing certain types of consumers. The coeﬃcient
on income less than $25,000 (0.59) indicates these individuals are likely to be informed about 41%
of the products without seeing an advertisement, coeﬃcient on income between $25,000-$49,000
(0.43) indicates these individuals are likely to be informed about 57% of the products without
seeing an advertisement, whereas having a high income (> $100,000) is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from having a middle income in terms of being informed without seeing an ad. Possibly, lower-
income individuals have lower opportunity costs and thus more time to search for information. the
diﬀerence between the two low-income groups is explained by the fact that individuals with income
less than $25,000 may be on medicaid and have no incentive to search.
In addition, the probability of being informed without seeing any advertising the fully insured
is low (24%). Possibly these individuals are indiﬀerent in knowing which drug is the best for
them since they are covered whatever the cost by insurance. This ﬁnding reinforces the existence
of moral hazard and in fact shows that with limited information the moral hazard issue is more
salient. Finally, in the bottom of Table XI there are estimates of the parameters that are the same
across individuals (the γj parameters). Patients are signiﬁcantly more likely to know a drug the
longer it has been on the market (0.14), with stong diminishing returns (-0.08). This is intuitive,
for the longer it has been on the market, the more opportunity consumers have had to learn of it
by word-of-mouth or through advertising and diminishing returns are due to forgetting. There are
also decreasing returns to advertising in print (-0.42), television (-0.62) and internet (-0.07) media,
but they are decreasing at a faster rate for television.
v Substitution Patterns and Information Provision
Table XII presents own- and cross-price elasticities of demand for selected antidepressants. These
are weighted averages for the years 2000 and 2001. The reported cross-price elasticities are averaged
over drugs of the same type. The selection includes one NewGen, all SSRIs, NDRIs and SNRIs.
The selected antidepressants help show the superiority of the RCL model over the other estimated
models in describing substitution patterns and, moreover, help distinguish the diﬀerences between
the FIM and LIM models. Drugs with similar characteristics have larger substitution patterns,
32ceteris paribus. Drugs within the same molecule that are both branded should essentially have
almost identical cross-price elasticities. For instance, Prozac, Prozac Weekly and Sarafem have
very close cross-price elasticities of demand with respect to other drugs. Similarly Wellbutrin and
Wellbutrin SR. Note that drugs of the same molecule but not both branded have similar relative
cross-price elasticities but the elasticities are not similar in magnitude. The estimated strong
preference for brandness exacerbated by the inclusion of demographics accounts for the diﬀerence.
The table can be used to show, for example, that SSRIs tend to be closer substitutes to other
SSRIs, less so to NDRIs and MAOIs and much less to TCAs. Moreover, the table shows that the
only generic in SSRIs has high cross-price elasticities with all other SSRIs. This is explained by the
fact that patients are more willing to substitute towards a me-too drug when that is much cheaper.
INSERT TABLE XII ABOUT HERE
Advertising elasticities work in the opposite fashion. Own advertising elasticities are positive,
that is. more advetising raised own market share; cross-advertising are negative, that is, more
advertising reduces market shares for other brands, more so of brands that are in close competi-
tion.32 Therefore, we observe highest cross-advertising elasticities with drugs of the same molecule,
followed by drugs of the same type. As Sovinsky Goeree (2008) has shown, substitution among
drugs could be induced by changes in choice sets, which is signiﬁcantly impacted by advertising
with varying eﬀects across consumers. When advertising changes, the impact on the choice set is
more pronounced for those consumers who are more sensitive to advertising. The ﬁrms’ decisions
of what prices to charge and how much information to provide through advertising depend on these
price and advertising elasticities of demand.
Finally, price elasticities were estimated for both the FIM and LIM models. The extent to
which a ﬁrm can exercise market power depends on the elasticity of its drug’s demand curve. The
greater the number of competitors or the larger the cross-elasticity of demand with other drugs,
the greater the elasticity of the ﬁrm’s demand curve and the less its market power. The major
diﬀerence in the FIM and LIM models is that the former predicts higher elasticities implying that
the antidepressant market is quite competitive. Without the full information assumption, however,
the industry is less competitive and products are less substitutable than in FIM. This arises because
32Note that generics are not advertised so no elasticities can be computed.
33less of information by consumers implies smaller choice sets, and consequently less subsitutability
and less competitiveness.
VI WELFARE IMPLICATIONS
The underlying assumption for a demand-based assessment of patient WTP is that consumer
surplus can be measured by the revealed preferences of consumers through their observed choices.33
In a market for a single, homogeneous drug, only patients that value the drug above its price
purchase the drug. Patient surplus, therefore, is the area between the demand curve and the price
and incremental welfare from product innovation is the before-and-after the innovation diﬀerence
in the area under the demand curve.
Patient welfare associated with each drug, conditional on the prices and characteristics of avail-
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where each sijt is computed using the estimated parameters as in equation (4) summing over
the estimated distribution of varying patient price sensitivities, F(αi,σα). Dividing the computed
patient welfare by the price sensitivity in equation (8) gives the monetary amount a patient would be
willing-to-pay to be faced with a choice set Jt prior to observing the realization of her idiosyncratic
utility.
i Moral Hazard
Patients insured against prescription drug expenditures are willing to pay higher prices for their
medications than they would be willing to pay when uninsured. This is reﬂected in the very low
estimated marginal disutility of price that results from the presence of prescription drug coverage.
The moral hazard problem appears more severe when we relax the full information assumption,
as limited information has led to more inelastic demand curves. To address the moral hazard
issue, welfare should be estimated both when patients are insured and when patients are uninsured
against prescription costs. The former estimate reﬂects the social willingness-to-pay, the latter the
33Similar analyses in Trajtenberg (1990), Ellickson, Stern and Trajtenberg (2001), Cleanthous (2003).
34private willingness-to-pay. The diﬀerence in the two is attributed to moral hazard.
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Table XIII presents the welfare estimates for patients without insurance in 1980 dollars for
selected antidepressants for both the full and limited information models. This is the ‘true’ patient’s
willingness-to-pay over the price charged, the moral hazard, that arises due to the inclusion of
prescription insurance in the computation of welfare gains. The ﬂexibility of the model allows me
to remove the simulated individuals that have prescription insurance from the estimation of welfare
gains. I, therefore, recalculate the gains that exclude prescription drug insurance and report them
in the total welfare column. With the exclusion of insurance, estimated patient gains are insightful.
Finding surplus per unit (average daily dosage) in the next column, shows a patient’s willingness-to-
pay above the price of the drug. The last column of Table XIII shows the excess willingness-to-pay
accrued annually averaged over the data. In other words, an individual patient would be willing to
pay $8,929 in a year over the amount already spent to be able to use Prozac in FIM, compared to
$9,821 in LIM. Comparing this to the average annual cost of depression of an individual patient34,
$3,351, a patient would be willing to pay 3.7 times more a year for a Prozac treatment under FIM
and 3.9 times more a year under LIM.
As expected, when limiting consumer information, the estimated inelastic demands for drugs
produce larger welfare estimates than in the full information model, and consequently, a steeper
moral hazard problem. As pharmaceutical ﬁrms use informative advertising to extract monopoly
power, they exacerbate the moral hazard that arises due to prescription drug insurance. The use
of the limited information model as introduced by Sovinsky Goeree (2008) has aided in calculating
the eﬀect of informative advertising on moral hazard.
In general, demand estimation has shown that ins u r e dp a t i e n t st e n dt ob el e s sp r i c es e n s i t i v e
than uninsured patients, and more so when we take into account that patients are not informed
about all the drugs available to them. This leads to a moral hazard, which I estimate by evaluating
the willigness-to-pay for treatment had there been no insurance. These results on welfare gains and
patient willingness-to-pay are useful to pharmaceutical companies to target drug characteristics
in new innovations, to extract the extra willingness- to-pay through pricing, to advertise to the
34Annual deﬂated average of Greenberg et al (1993) and Badamgarav et al (2003).
35right demograhic group and through the correct medium. Public policy can also use these welfare
estimates. For instance, comparing these results to research and development costs provide cost-
beneﬁt analysis of new drug introduction. Moreover, governments can evaluate the fairness of
pharmaceutical pricing practices and the eﬀect of direct-to-consumer advertising and direct-to-
physician advertising on consumer welfare.
VII CONCLUSION
Pharmaceutical markets are characterized by a high degree of innovation, complexity and uncer-
tainty, especially markets of idiosyncratic symptomatolgy and response to treatment such as the
antidepressant market. In this paper, I show that it is unreasonable to assume that consumers are
aware of all antidepressants for sale at the time of purchase, as is the case in traditional models
of consumer choice. Such an assumption biases demand curves towards being more elastic and, in
consequence, the full information assumption biases the evaluation of consumer welfare downwards.
This paper, therefore, aims at analyzing and evaluating the eﬀects of promotions by pharmaceutical
ﬁrms on patient welfare taking into account the interaction of multiple agents (patients, physicians,
insurance companies and pharmaceutical companies) in the decision process.
I formulate an empirical methodology that incorporates both macro- and micro-level data in
the U.S. antidepressant market and takes into account the multi-agent interaction to estimate
demand and welfare. I use an empirical discrete-choice model of limited information, where ad-
vertising inﬂuences the set of drugs from which a purchase choice is made. The paper employs an
original dataset that consists of annual observations on prices, quantities, direct-to-physician and
direct-to-consumer advertising, media exposure by demographic and drug characteristics for all an-
tidepressants sold in the U.S. market from 1980 to 2001 and demographic data on the distribution
of patient income and prescription insurance.
Estimation results indicate that pharmaceutical ﬁrms use advertising media to target high-
income households and households with more comprehensive prescription drug insurance schemes
through their physicians or directly. Comparison of the full and limited information models shows
that limited information leads to less elastic demand curves and more reasonable substitution
patterns. As a result, I derive larger estimates of patient welfare due to pharmaceutical innovation
that exacerbate the moral hazard issue that arises due to the existence of prescription drug insurance
36coverage. Patients are willing-to-pay more for a drug when they are covered by prescription drug
insurance and even higher when their choice set is smaller due to limited information.
These results imply that the pharmaceutical industry is not as competitive as a full information
model would predict. Firms use informative advertising to maintain market power and monopoly
proﬁts for their product. The paper estimates large and precise patient welfare gains due to
innovation and explains the detected divergence between social and private patient beneﬁts by the
presence of insurance in the full information model and show how this is much bigger with limited
informations. These ﬁndings aid in public policy decision making on health care and pharmaceutical
industry concerns.
Demand estimates correctly detect marginal disutilities for drug side eﬀects and estimated drug
substitution patterns accurately reﬂect diﬀerences in patient tastes for drug attributes. I ﬁnd a
large mean price disutility, which varies with income and insurance demographics. The estimated
price sensitivity decreases with patient income, when patients are insured against prescription drug
expenditures and with limited information. Moreover, patients demonstrate a high preference for
branded drugs when these do not face generic competition and a disutility to brandness when
generic competition exists. The wealthier the patients and the more insurance coverage they have,
the higher the preference and, therefore, the more they will be targetted by pharmaceutical ﬁrms.
VIII APPENDIX
The simple logit model can be estimated with and without instruments using the following equation:
ln(sjt) − ln(s0t)=αpjt + x0
jtβ + ξjt. (9)
Three nested multinomial logit models are also estimated with and without instruments. The
estimation equations for the three models (NML1a, NML1b, NML2) are, respectively:
ln(sjt) − ln(s0t)=αpjt + x0
jtβ + ξjt + ρc ln(e sj/c,t) (10)
where the only naturally-occurring nested group is assumed to be the ‘type’ of the antidepressant
and ρc is the within-type correlation coeﬃcient of utility;
37ln(sjt) − ln(s0t)=αpjt + x0
jtβ + ξjt + ρc ln(e sj/mc,t) (11)
where the only naturally-occurring nested group is assumed to be the ‘molecule’ of the antidepres-
sant and ρm is the within-molecule correlation coeﬃcient of utility;
ln(sjt) − ln(s0t)=αpjt + x0
jtβ + ξjt + ρmc ln(e smc/c,t)+γ ln(e sj/mc,t) (12)
where the two naturally-occurring nested groups are assumed to be the ‘type’ and ‘molecule’ of
the antidepressant and ρc, ρm are the within-type and within-molecule correlation coeﬃcients of
utility.
In these nested logit models, ρc, ρmc,a n dγ are correlation coeﬃcients and have to be between
zero and one. In NML1a ρc is the within-type utility correlation parameter and is the coeﬃcient of
the market share of drug j within type c.I nN M L 1 b ,ρmc is the within-molecule utility correlation
parameter and is the coeﬃcient of the market share of drug j within type mc.I n N M L 2 , ρc is
obtained by inserting the estimates for ρmc and γ in γ =[ 1− (1 − ρmc)(1 − ρc)]. The closer
these correlation coeﬃcients are to one the more valid the assumption that the nesting groups are
naturally-occurring.
The low and sometimes insigniﬁcant correlation coeﬃcients in the nested multinomial logit
models are reason to favor the full random coeﬃcient model which places no restriction on the
correlation between antidepressants.
INSERT TABLES A1 AND A2 ABOUT HERE
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402008
Total AD Total AD Total AD Total AD Total AD Total
Sales (Billion $) 434 32.1 0.13 102 0.96 163 3.04 229 10.1 654 12.5 928
Advertising-to-Sales Ratio (%) 5.3 n.a. 15 n.a. 13 5.1 18 6.9 9.7 4.6 8.1 4.2
Advertising-to-Margin Ratio (%) 7.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 7.1 n.a. 9.5 n.a. 6.0 n.a. 5.5
Advertising Expenses (Billion $) 21.6 n.a. 0.02 n.a. 0.12 8.39 0.55 15.8 0.98 30.1 1.02 39.0
     Direct-to-Consumer Advertising  (%) 13 n.a. - n.a. - 4.5 - 16 12 14 12 11
     Professional Journal Advertising (%) 2.1 n.a. 22 n.a. 6.7 4.3 3.3 3.2 3.2 1.3 4 1.0
     Sales Representative Details (%) 25 n.a. 42 n.a. 47 35 45 30 34 24 34 17
     Retail Value of Samples (%) 60 n.a. 36 n.a. 46 57 52 51 51 61 49 71
Research & Development (Billion $) 26 1.5 n.a. 6.8 n.a. 12 n.a. 21 n.a. 31 n.a. 40
Notes: Data are for the pharmaceutical preparations industry (SIC 2834). Note that numbers may differ for broader categorizations as in Table II, for
example. Data for sales, advertising expenses and their ratios come from Schonfeld & Associates via AdAge.com; data for advertising expenses (exclude
promotion spending for professional meetings and events) and their breakout come from IMS Health, Inc., Integrated Promotional Service, and Competitive
Media Reporting; data for R&D come from PhRMA's annual industry review. 'Total' column refers to the whole pharmaceutical industry and 'AD' to the
antidepressant market. Advertising-to-Sales Ratio=Advertising/Net Sales; Advertising-to-Margin Ratio=Advertising Expense/(Net Sales-Cost of Goods Sold).
Direct-to-consumer advertising includes advertising for prescription drugs on TV, radio, magazines and newspapers, as well as internet and outdoor
advertising; professional journal advertising reflects advertising expenditures for prescription drugs appearing in medical journals; sales representative details
include costs associated with the sales activities of pharmaceutical representatives that are directed to office-based physicians, hospital-based physicians, and
directors of pharmacies; samples are prescription drugs given to physicians to disseminate freely to patients.
TABLE I
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY AND ANTIDEPRESSANT MARKET SUMMARY STATISTICS
1980 1990 1995 2000 2005 Annual 
Average
411995 2000 2005 2008
Total Media Expenditure (Billion $) 2.8 5.1 8.4 8.7
     Magazine (%) 25.1 26.0 27.3 28.4
     Newspaper (%) 4.5 3.4 2.6 2.5
     Television (%) 57.4 52.7 45.4 46.7
     Cable Networks (%) 8.9 15.3 16.4 16.9
     Internet (%) - - 4.6 3.2
     Outdoor (%) 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.3
     Radio (%) 3.6 2.6 3.4 2.0
TABLE II
MEDIA BREAKOUT IN THE U.S. PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
Notes: Data are for the 'medicines & proprietary remedies' category (aggregated
from TNS classifications) by LNA, which include pharmaceutical houses,
medicines & proprietary remedies, fitness, eye glasses, medical equipment.
This is a broader categorization than the SIC categorization in Table I, hence,
the discrepancy in total DTC spending. Percentages calculated from measured
media. Magazines include Sunday, local, and Spanish-language magazine;
newspaper includes national and Spanish-language newspaper; television




















(Billion $)  (%)  (%)  (%) (Billion $)  (%)  (%)  (%) (Billion $)  (%)  (%)  (%)
Top 10 Firms 4.47 21.6 78.4 0.02 9.90 23.3 76.3 0.4 12.32 29.6 65.5 4.9
Abbott Laboratories 0.13 17.9 82.1 0.00 0.28 12.7 87.5 0.0 0.41 44.6 53.9 1.5
AstraZeneca n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.20 38.4 61.5 0.1 0.80 40.6 50.3 9.1
Bayer AG 0.39 17.2 82.7 0.09 0.65 7.7 92.1 0.2 0.57 14.8 79.8 5.4
Bristol-Myers Squibb 0.44 22.9 77.1 0.05 1.19 33.2 66.5 0.3 0.58 57.8 37.3 4.9
Eli Lilly & Co. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.10 29.9 63.8 6.4 0.48 14.6 80.2 5.2
GlaxoSmithKline 0.44 40.6 58.9 0.45 1.13 19.2 79.7 1.2 2.19 26.0 70.8 3.2
Johnson & Johnson 0.80 17.3 82.7 0.00 1.60 20.1 79.9 0.1 2.21 32.7 63.1 4.3
Merck & Co. 0.07 82.5 17.5 0.00 0.98 41.1 58.9 0.0 0.77 33.6 61.9 4.6
Novartis 0.36 19.0 81.0 0.00 0.57 19.5 80.5 0.0 1.16 18.5 74.7 6.7
Pfizer Inc. 0.16 26.9 73.1 0.00 2.27 24.4 74.8 0.8 2.15 33.6 61.3 5.1
Schering-Plough 0.20 48.7 51.3 0.00 0.51 22.7 76.6 0.7 0.85 14.5 82.3 3.2
Notes: Firms are presented alphabetically and they must have been included in the top 10 firms in at least one of the three reported years. Data are for the
'medicines & proprietary remedies' category (aggregated from TNS classifications) by LNA, which include pharmaceutical houses, medicines & proprietary
remedies, fitness, eye glasses, medical equipment. Top 10 firms are according to each year. Print includes Sunday, local, and Spanish-language magazine and
national and Spanish-language newspaper; TV includes network, national spot and local. Astrazeneca and Eli Lilly's advertising data are not available for 1995.
TABLE III
MEDIA BREAKOUT OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING FOR SELECTED PHARMACEUTICAL FIRMS
1995 2000 2005
43Type Molecule Drug Name Generic Name
1 1 1 Marplan Isocarboxazid
122 Nardil Phenelzine
1 3 3 Parnate Tranylcypromine
2 4 4 Elavil Amitriptyline
2 4 5 Endep Amitriptyline
2 4 6 Generic Amitriptyline
2 5 7 Asendin Amoxapine
2 5 8 Generic Amoxapine
2 6 9 Anafranil Clomipramine
2 6 10 Generic Clomipramine
2 7 11 Generic Desipramine
2 7 12 Norpramin Desipramine
2 7 13 Pertofrane Desipramine
2 8 14 Adapin Doxepin
2 8 15 Generic Doxepin
2 8 16 Sinequan Doxepin
2 9 17 Generic Imipramine
2 9 18 Janimine Imipramine
2 9 19 Tofranil Imipramine
2 10 20 Tofranil PM Imipramine Pamoate
2 11 21 Generic Maprotiline
2 11 22 Ludiomil Maprotiline
2 12 23 Aventyl Nortriptyline
2 12 24 Generic Nortriptyline
2 12 25 Pamelor Nortriptyline
2 13 26 Generic Protriptyline
2 13 27 Vivactil Protriptyline
2 14 28 Generic Trimipramine
2 14 29 Surmontil Trimipramine
3 15 30 Serzone Nefazodone
3 16 31 Desyrel Trazodone
3 16 32 Generic Trazodone
4 17 33 Celexa Citalopram
4 18 34 Prozac Fluoxetine
4 18 35 Prozac Weekly Fluoxetine
4 18 36 Sarafem Fluoxetine
4 19 37 Generic Fluvoxamine
4 19 38 Luvox Fluvoxamine
4 20 39 Paxil Paroxetine
4 21 40 Zoloft Sertraline
5 22 41 Generic Bupropion
5 22 42 Wellbutrin Bupropion
5 22 43 Wellbutrin SR Bupropion
6 23 44 Effexor Venlafaxine
6 23 45 Effexor-XR Venlafaxine
7 24 46 Remeron Mirtazapine
7 24 47 Remeron Soltab Mirtazapine
TABLE IV
CHOICE IN THE ANTIDEPRESSANT MARKET






















































































































1980 1990 2001 1980 1990 2001 FREQHALF FAT AC DR IA OH CA GID WTG
(1) MAOI 330000 1959 1.51 1.74 1.07 1.51 1.76 1.09 Mean 1.7 19.3 4.00 0.00 1.67 2.00 4.00 0.00 1.00 1.67
StdDev 0.0 8.1 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.58
(2) TCA 11 16 10 2 2 8 1959 98.5 76.5 44.1 98.5 87.1 59.6 Mean 1.2 26.2 1.83 2.57 2.78 0.70 2.78 2.43 0.43 2.13
StdDev 0.4 17.7 0.39 1.04 1.13 0.63 1.00 0.51 0.90 1.22
(3) NewGen 221221 1982 - 13.6 8.61 - 5.71 5.37 Mean 2.7 22.3 1.00 2.00 4.00 0.33 3.00 0.67 3.00 0.00
StdDev 0.0 16.7 0.00 1.73 0.00 0.58 1.73 0.58 0.00 0.00
(4) SSRI 571571 1988 - 38.4 65.4 - 23.2 48.4 Mean 1.0 71.6 1.00 0.50 0.75 2.25 0.25 0.25 3.00 0.13
StdDev 0.0 80.4 0.00 0.93 1.39 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.00 0.35
(5) NDRI 121121 1989 - - 5.96 - - 4.18 Mean 2.5 15.0 1.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00
StdDev 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(6) SNRI 120120 1994 - 0.95 4.51 - 0.83 3.27 Mean 3.0 16.7 0.50 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
StdDev 0.0 12.7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(7) NaSSA 120120 1996 - - 1.95 - - 0.57 Mean 1.0 2.0 1.00 1.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00
StdDev 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
24 34 13 12 17 11 1959 Mean 1.5 31.5 1.60 1.61 2.11 1.16 1.98 1.43 1.25 1.39
StdDev 0.8 40.4 0.85 1.43 1.54 0.91 1.61 1.17 1.33 1.37
TABLE V






























































































































45Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Male 0.489 0.002 0.488 0.002
White 0.835 0.017 0.835 0.017
Age (years) 35.32 2.88 34.94 2.77
< 35 0.528 0.036 0.535 0.036
35-54 0.108 0.015 0.109 0.015
> 54 0.328 0.014 0.332 0.014
Education (years) 13.53 2.64 13.55 2.45
Married 0.566 0.015 0.574 0.015
Household size (persons) 2.662 0.046 2.660 0.046
Employed 0.598 0.026 0.597 0.026
Income ($) 58,629 6,126 58,211 6,020
Under $25,000 0.273 0.020 0.274 0.020
$25,000 to $49,999 0.272 0.013 0.273 0.013
$50,000 to $99,999 0.314 0.015 0.312 0.015
$100,000 and over 0.142 0.032 0.141 0.032
0.020 0.016 0.020 0.016
Prescription Drug Expenditures:
Public 0.196 0.019 0.196 0.019
Private 0.344 0.075 0.344 0.075
Out-of-Pocket 0.460 0.093 0.460 0.093
Media Exposure Mean Std. Dev.
Television (hours per person per year) 1,586 42.85
Radio (hours per person per year) 964 15.31
Print (hours per person per year) 360 11.41
Internet (hours per person per year) 80 53.73
Antidepressant Prescription
Population Sample
Notes: Variables are dummies unless units are specified. Data come from Nielsen Media Research,
IMS Health, National Center for Health Statistics, Bureau of Labor Statistics: Consumer Population
Survey, Veronis Suhler Stevenson: Communications Industry Forecast.
TABLE VI
CONSUMER CHARACTERISTICS
46(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable
Price -0.155** -2.709*** -1.795* -0.996** -1.108*** -0.872***
[0.071] [0.124] [1.045] [0.424] [0.025] [0.042]
Half-life 0.006** 0.004 0.005 -0.350*** -0.673* -0.355***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.007] [0.053] [0.505] [0.047]
Fatal -0.536*** -0.731*** -2.184*** -2.076*** -2.665** -0.508**
[0.132] [0.142] [0.451] [0.368] [1.064] [0.172]
Weight Gain -0.039 -0.213** -0.303* -0.294** -0.453*** -0.322***
[0.086] [0.095] [0.162] [0.125] [0.124] [0.113]
0.492*** 0.419*** -0.825 -0.770 -0.777*** -0.340*
[0.099] [0.105] [0.571] [0.512] [0.137] [0.205]
Side Effects -1.975*** -1.299** -4.148** -0.756** -1.140** -1.076**
[0.574] [0.613] [1.697] [0.381] [0.545] [0.467]
Age 0.151*** 0.163*** 0.374*** 0.160*** -0.068*** -0.222***
[0.023] [0.024] [0.044] [0.045] [0.021] [0.028]
-0.156*** -0.170*** -1.276* -0.354*** -1.017*** -0.219
[0.046] [0.050] [0.667] [0.069] [0.147] [0.143]
0.865*** 0.516** 1.629** 1.352*** 2.038*** 1.589**
[0.203] [0.221] [0.747] [0.313] [0.540] [0.684]
-1.337*** -0.949*** -1.337*** -0.180* -0.882*** -0.352***
[0.173] [0.221] [0.173] [0.101] [0.179] [0.131]
Constant 2.142*** 2.015*** 10.231*** 1.887** 10.780*** 3.382***
[0.333] [0.349] [2.605] [0.838] [3.873] [0.868]
(no demographics) (demographics)
(limited info.) (limited info.) (full info.) (full info.) (limited info.)
TABLE VII
DEMAND ESTIMATION WITH FULL AND LIMITED INFORMATION 
Branded Drug 
with Generic
Notes: Dependent variable: ln(σijt)-ln(σ0t). Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, 1% statistical
significance, respectively. Number of observations: 658. Side Effects include anti-cholinergic, drowsiness, cardiac arrhythmias,
orthostatic hypotension and gastrointestinal distress effects. Branded Drug with(out) Generics refers to the drugs where there has













Coefficients of Characteristics (β's)
Random Coefficients
47Standard
Means Deviations Income Prescription
Variable  (α & β's) (Λ) Income  Sqrd Insurance
Price -0.872*** 0.131*** 0.134*** -0.041* 0.832*
[0.042] [0.020] [0.038] [0.013] [0.488]
Half-life -0.355*** 0.288** - - -
[0.047] [0.120]
Fatal -0.508** 0.127*** - - -
[0.172] [0.040]
Weight Gain -0.322*** 0.896 - - -
[0.113] [0.998]
-0.340* 0.350*** - - -
[0.205] [0.095]
Side Effects -1.076** 0.183 - - -
[0.467] [0.293]
Age -0.222*** 0.014 - - -
[0.028] [0.013]
-0.219 0.131 - - -
[0.143] [1.004]
1.589** 0.144*** 1.256** 0.059* 0.467***
[0.684] [0.013] [0.503] [0.033] [0.000]
-0.352*** 0.020* 0.060* 0.002 -0.465*
[0.131] [0.011] [0.036] [0.093] [0.252]
Constant 3.382*** 0.676 - - -
[0.868] [0.995]
TABLE VIII
LIMITED INFORMATION RANDOM COEFFICIENT MODEL
Interactions with Demographics
Notes: Dependent variable: ln(σijt)-ln(σ0t). Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, 1%
statistical significance, respectively. Number of observations: 658. Side Effects include anti-cholinergic,
drowsiness, cardiac arrhythmias, orthostatic hypotension and gastrointestinal distress effects. Branded Drug
with(out) Generics refers to the drugs where there has (not) been generic introduction in the respective molecule.
Price is in logs. 
Insomnia/ Agitation
Side-Effect-Age Ineraction
Branded Drug without 
Generic
Branded Drug with Generic
48Without Any Insurance
With Full Insurance
(Generics) (No Gen.) (Generics) (No Gen.) (Generics) (No Gen.) (Generics) (No Gen.)
Without Any Insurance -0.882*** 2.038*** -0.464* 3.082*** -0.352*** 1.589** -0.290 2.591***
[0.179] [0.540] [0.256] [0.284] [0.131] [0.684] [0.260] [0.331]
With Full Insurance -0.588** 3.870** -0.068* 4.759** 0.113 2.056*** 0.175* 3.371**
[0.299] [1.681] [0.056] [1.860] [0.077] [0.684] [0.102] [1.346]
Brand Sensitivities
Full Information Limited Information








Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, 1% statistical significance, respectively. Generics column refers to branded
drugs with generic entry in its molecule. No Gen. column refers to branded drugs with no generic entry within their molecule.
Full Information Limited Information
Low Income High Income Low Income High Income
Price Sensitivities
RANDOM COEFFICIENT LOGIT ELASTICITIES: PRICE
TABLE IX
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  *, **, ***  indicate 10%, 5%, 1% statistical significance, respectively.









49Variable Print Television Internet Radio
Consumer Information Heterogeneity Coefficients
Media and demographic interactions (Y)
-1.143*** -0.960*** -0.867*** -1.150***
[0.035] [0.039] [0.044] [0.040]
0.067*** 0.020 -0.034 -0.034
[0.025] [0.027] [0.023] [0.026]
0.281*** 0.216*** 0.005 -0.270***
[0.024] [0.022] [0.023] [0.026]
0.092*** 0.075*** -0.023 -0.013
[0.021] [0.021] [0.018] [0.016]
-0.299*** 0.492*** 0.002 -0.270***
[0.028] [0.020] [0.022] [0.030]
-0.202*** 0.131*** -0.182*** -0.123***
[0.018] [0.019] [0.018] [0.024]
0.140*** -0.022 0.141*** 0.155***
[0.032] [0.032] [0.034] [0.030]
-0.040** -0.018 -0.070*** 0.006
[0.018] [0.017] [0.015] [0.017]
-0.183*** 0.252*** -0.108*** 0.073***
[0.025] [0.025] [0.030] [0.028]
-0.068** 0.270*** 0.031 0.114***
[0.031] [0.030] [0.026] [0.032]
-0.052** 0.141*** -0.021 0.083***
[0.020] [0.027] [0.027] [0.024]
-0.048*** 0.028*** -0.032*** -0.012***
[0.004] [0.002] [0.004] [0.003]
0.095*** 0.016*** 0.040*** 0.010*
[0.020] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006]
Advertising media exposure (ζ)
0.796***
[0.064]












INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY PARAMETER ESTIMATES
Coefficients for Interactions With Media
Constant













Income:                          
> $100,000
Income:                   
$25,000-$49,999







Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, 1%
statistical significance, respectively. Dummy variables unless units are specified
Constant
Income:                             
> $100,000
Income:                        
$25,000-$49,999
Income:                             
< $25,000
50Variable































Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, 1%























51MAOI  TCA  NewGen  SSRI  NDRIs  SNRI  NaSSA ALL
Drug OPE (3) (26) (3) (8) (3) (2) (2) (47)
Price Elasticities Under Full Information
3 15 30 Serzone -1.1645 0.0252 0.4029 0.6825 0.0870 0.0817 0.1204 0.0147 0.0706
4 17 33 Celexa -0.1470 0.1053 0.1685 0.1584 0.7437 0.3419 0.5034 0.0617 0.2615
4 18 34 Prozac -0.5415 0.1689 0.2703 0.2541 0.8347 0.2742 0.4038 0.0989 0.4716
4 18 36 Sarafem -0.8147 0.1051 0.1683 0.1582 0.7588 0.3414 0.5027 0.0616 0.2115
4 19 37 Fluvoxamine [G] -2.4038 0.0189 0.0303 0.0285 1.1007 0.0615 0.4526 0.1109 0.0249
4 19 38 Luvox -1.4660 0.0130 0.2086 0.1961 0.7129 0.4233 0.3116 0.0764 0.4041
4 20 39 Paxil -0.7208 0.0549 0.2196 0.2064 0.7002 0.4455 0.3936 0.0321 0.4445
4 21 40 Zoloft -0.5991 0.0186 0.2969 0.2791 0.6813 0.3012 0.4435 0.0109 0.4798
5 22 41 Bupropion [G] -1.3992 0.0372 0.0595 0.0559 0.2140 1.5785 0.5332 0.2177 0.0996
5 22 42 Wellbutrin -0.6952 0.0243 0.1299 0.1221 0.2103 0.8289 0.4656 0.1426 0.0737
5 22 43 Wellbutrin SR -1.0743 0.0399 0.1595 0.1999 0.2296 1.1112 0.3813 0.0234 0.1037
6 23 44 Effexor -0.4936 0.0276 0.1105 0.2077 0.2385 0.4482 2.6565 0.0162 0.1574
6 23 45 Effexor-XR -1.8536 0.0747 0.1495 0.1124 0.2151 0.4851 1.3384 0.0438 0.1952
Price Elasticities Under Limited Information
3 15 30 Serzone -1.1032 0.0167 0.2959 0.6776 0.0458 0.0616 0.0832 0.0088 0.0651
4 17 33 Celexa -0.1278 0.0929 0.1341 0.1185 0.6729 0.2564 0.4159 0.0362 0.2045
4 18 34 Prozac -0.4766 0.1199 0.2464 0.1988 0.5402 0.2491 0.3413 0.0832 0.3160
4 18 36 Sarafem -0.7313 0.1160 0.1309 0.0991 0.7051 0.3031 0.4442 0.0365 0.0200
4 19 37 Fl i [G] 2 1277 0 0174 0 0253 0 0237 1 1742 0 0504 0 3377 0 0771 0 0229
TABLE XII


















4 19 37 Fluvoxamine [G] -2.1277 0.0174 0.0253 0.0237 1.1742 0.0504 0.3377 0.0771 0.0229
4 19 38 Luvox -0.6544 0.0113 0.1851 0.1684 0.4912 0.3919 0.3021 0.0668 0.2557
4 20 39 Paxil -0.6788 0.0324 0.1774 0.1739 0.5788 0.3012 0.2743 0.0265 0.4680
4 21 40 Zoloft -0.4851 0.0113 0.2550 0.2005 0.5201 0.0977 0.1739 0.0078 0.3688
5 22 41 Bupropion [G] -1.2495 0.0265 0.0535 0.0474 0.1876 1.6126 0.3290 0.2384 0.0888
5 22 42 Wellbutrin -0.4312 0.0186 0.1046 0.1160 0.1316 0.1610 0.3835 0.1226 0.0727
5 22 43 Wellbutrin SR -0.9808 0.0316 0.1220 0.1121 0.1928 0.9625 0.3392 0.0160 0.0698
6 23 44 Effexor -0.4011 0.0191 0.0622 0.1514 0.1398 0.4422 2.5552 0.0169 0.1629
6 23 45 Effexor-XR -1.1656 0.0695 0.0883 0.0833 0.2042 0.5415 1.1880 0.0358 0.1563
Advertising Elasticities
3 15 30 Serzone 0.0038 -0.0024 -0.0013 -0.0173 -0.0020 -0.0104 -0.0209 -0.0058 -0.0041
4 17 33 Celexa 0.0438 -0.0013 -0.0071 -0.0708 -0.0561 -0.0572 -0.0115 -0.0322 -0.0236
4 18 34 Prozac 0.0173 -0.0032 -0.0017 -0.0170 -0.0599 -0.0137 -0.0276 -0.0077 -0.0148
4 18 36 Sarafem 0.0301 -0.0015 -0.0080 -0.0798 -0.0096 -0.0645 -0.0130 -0.0363 -0.0175
4 1 9 3 7 F l u v o x a m i n e  [ G ] ---------
4 19 38 Luvox 0.0043 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0017 -0.0024 -0.0014 -0.0028 -0.0079 -0.0012
4 20 39 Paxil 0.0413 -0.0027 -0.0143 -0.0143 -0.0427 -0.0116 -0.0233 -0.0651 -0.0208
4 21 40 Zoloft 0.0250 -0.0017 -0.0092 -0.0923 -0.0585 -0.0746 -0.0150 -0.0419 -0.0282
5 2 2 4 1 B u p r o p i o n  [ G ] ---------
5 22 42 Wellbutrin 0.0327 -0.0073 -0.0384 -0.0384 -0.0600 -0.0629 -0.0624 -0.0174 -0.0418
5 22 43 Wellbutrin SR 0.0302 -0.0053 -0.0279 -0.0279 -0.0436 -0.0187 -0.0454 -0.0127 -0.0287
6 23 44 Effexor 0.0100 -0.0074 -0.0039 -0.0390 -0.0061 -0.0315 -0.0265 -0.0177 -0.0100
6 23 45 Effexor-XR 0.0257 -0.0072 -0.0038 -0.0379 -0.0059 -0.0306 -0.0975 -0.0172 -0.0128
Notes: Average of elasticities for the last two years of the dataset: 2000 and 2001, calculated from raw data. Specifically, column OPE
carries the own-price elasticities and the other columns the cross-price elasticities of each drug displayed against all other drugs
averaged by type. If the drug is compared to its own type, it is excluded from the average. Types 3-6 stand for NewGen, SSRI NDRI,
and SNRI respectively. The number of drugs in each type of antidepressants is displayed under each type heading. [G] indicates















3 15 30 Serzone Nefazodone 1995 212 0.01 3                     177,684 6.20 2,263             
4 17 33 Celexa Citalopram 1998 1,356 0.11 38                   37,827 2.93 1,070             
4 18 34 Prozac Fluoxetine 1988 1,995,377 24.46 8,929              2,194,698 26.91 9,821             
4 18 36 Sarafem Fluoxetine 2000 3,353 0.84 305                 62,583 15.62 5,700             
4 19 37 Generic Fluvoxamine 2000 8,669 7.82 2,856              8,917 8.05 2,937             
4 19 38 Luvox Fluvoxamine 1994 461 1.81 661                 414 1.63 595                
4 20 39 Paxil Paroxetine 1993 734 0.01 5                     1,003,593 19.00 6,935             
4 21 40 Zoloft Sertraline 1992 36 0.00 0                     6,006,786 52.83 192,827         
5 22 41 Generic Bupropion 1999 459 0.49 180                 2,920 3.14 1,145             
5 22 42 Wellbutrin Bupropion 1989 1,430 0.32 117                 25,461 5.72 2,089             
5 22 43 Wellbutrin SR Bupropion 1996 1,362 1.49 545                 1,671 1.83 668                
6 23 44 Effexor Venlafaxine 1994 297 0.01 3                     48,444 1.20 4,394             
6 23 45 Effexor-XR Venlafaxine 1997 1,436 0.34 125                 4,906 1.17 428                
Limited Information
Notes: Tables shows value of innovation for selected antidepressants. Types 3-6 stand for NewGen, SSRI, NDRI and SNRI, respectively.
TABLE XIII





















Drug Name Generic Name Entry
Patient Surplus
Full Information
 45 53OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Logit Logit NML1a NML1a NML1b NML1b NML2 NML2
Variable
Price -0.421*** -2.560*** -0.379* -2.066*** -0.144*** -2.620*** -0.155** -2.709***
[0.091] [0.164] [0.200] [0.163] [0.068] [0.116] [0.071] [0.124]
Type (ρt) 0.513*** 0.377*** 0.788*** 0.630***
[0.035] [0.043] [0.080] [0.088]
Molecule (ρm) 0.815*** 0.773*** 0.812*** 0.753***
[0.035] [0.037] [0.035] [0.038]
0.004 0.001 0.008*** 0.005 0.006** 0.005* 0.006** 0.004
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
-0.491*** -1.031*** -0.711*** -1.091*** -0.545*** -0.761*** -0.536*** -0.731***
[0.178] [0.207] [0.155] [0.180] [0.131] [0.142] [0.132] [0.142]
-0.300*** -0.609*** -0.207* -0.348*** -0.033 -0.171* -0.039 -0.213**
[0.115] [0.133] [0.123] [0.121] [0.085] [0.093] [0.086] [0.095]
0.554*** 0.516*** 0.831*** 0.726*** 0.506*** 0.493*** 0.492*** 0.419***
[0.130] [0.145] [0.115] [0.128] [0.096] [0.099] [0.099] [0.105]
-3.596*** -2.454*** -4.131*** -3.062*** -2.040*** -1.658*** -1.975*** -1.299**
[0.758] [0.855] [0.660] [0.746] [0.561] [0.586] [0.574] [0.613]
Age 0.182*** 0.234*** 0.229*** 0.259*** 0.154*** 0.176*** 0.151*** 0.163***
[0.030] [0.034] [0.026] [0.029] [0.022] [0.023] [0.023] [0.024]
-0.204*** -0.274*** -0.244*** -0.282*** -0.242*** -0.218*** -0.156*** -0.170***
[0.056] [0.045] [0.044] [0.049] [0.045] [0.042] [0.046] [0.050]
0.427*** 0.654** 0.988*** 0.904*** 0.894*** 0.682*** 0.865*** 0.516**
[0.116] [0.289] [0.239] [0.126] [0.195] [0.206] [0.203] [0.221]
-2.563*** -2.031*** -1.880*** -1.121*** -1.315*** -1.044*** -1.337*** -0.949***
[0.201] [0.274] [0.195] [0.262] [0.173] [0.229] [0.173] [0.221]
3.822*** 2.953*** 2.085*** 1.842*** 2.104*** 1.840*** 2.142*** 2.015***
[0.432] [0.491] [0.394] [0.439] [0.325] [0.341] [0.333] [0.349]
R
2  0.343 0.311 0.381 0.237 0.558 0.525 0.559 0.517
Adjusted R






Notes: Dependent variable: ln(σjt)-ln(σ0t). Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, 1%
statistical significance, respectively. Number of observations: 658. Side Effects include anti-cholinergic, drowsiness,
cardiac arrhythmias, orthostatic hypotension and gastrointestinal distress effects. Branded Drug with(out) Generics refer 









LIMITED INFORMATION DEMAND ESTIMATION ACROSS MODELS
Price Coefficients (α's)
Group Correlation Coefficients (ρ's)
Coefficients of Characteristics (β's)
54(1) (3) (5) (1) (2) (3)
Variable
Price -0.155** -0.170** -0.091*** -2.709*** -1.745*** -1.475***
[0.071] [0.072] [0.022] [0.124] [0.125] [0.120]
Type (ρt) 0.788*** 0.720*** 0.724*** 0.630*** 0.570*** 0.593***
[0.080] [0.079] [0.081] [0.088] [0.088] [0.089]
Molecule (ρm) 0.812*** 0.807*** 0.820*** 0.753*** 0.747*** 0.776***
[0.035] [0.036] [0.036] [0.038] [0.039] [0.038]
Half-life 0.006** 0.005** 0.007*** 0.004 0.006** 0.007***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Fatal -0.536*** -0.432*** -0.731*** -0.635***
[0.132] [0.126] [0.142] [0.137]
Weight Gain -0.039 -0.172** -0.213** -0.344***









Age 0.151*** 0.133*** 0.078*** 0.163*** 0.144*** 0.073***
[0.023] [0.026] [0.022] [0.024] [0.027] [0.022]
-0.156*** -0.176*** -0.098*** -0.170*** -0.174*** -0.086*
[0.046] [0.022] [0.021] [0.050] [0.025] [0.047]
0.865*** 0.446** 0.784*** 0.516** 0.844*** 0.620***
[0.203] [0.180] [0.166] [0.221] [0.127] [0.174]
-1.337*** -1.328*** -1.023*** -0.949*** -1.039*** -0.757***
[0.173] [0.162] [0.162] [0.221] [0.196] [0.195]
2.142*** 1.963*** 1.711*** 2.015*** 1.831*** 1.496***
[0.333] [0.353] [0.366] [0.349] [0.371] [0.379]
R
2  0.559 0.546 0.521 0.517 0.501 0.494
Adjusted R
2 0.551 0.539 0.516 0.509 0.493 0.487
1
st Stage F-stat 92.61 100.25 103.98
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log Likelihood -1,204 -1,213 -1,230
Branded Drug without 
Generic
Branded Drug with 
Generic
Constant
Notes: Dependent variable: ln(σjt)-ln(σ0t). Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, 1% statistical
significance, respectively. Number of observations: 658. Side Effects (5) include anti-cholinergic, drowsiness, cardiac
arrhythmias, orthostatic hypotension and gastrointestinal distress effects. Side Effects (6) include, in addition,
insomnia/agitation. Side Effects (8) include in addition fatal and weight gain. Branded Drug with(out) Generics refer to the
drugs where there has (not) been generic introduction in the respective molecule. Price is in logs. 







Group Correlation Coefficients (ρ's)
TABLE A.II
LIMITED INFORMATION DEMAND ESTIMATION WITH DIFFERENT SPECIFICATIONS FOR NML2
























































































































































































Advertising Expenditure Evolution by Type in the U.S. Antidepressant  Market
Notes: DTC includes advertising for prescription drugs on TV, radio, magazines and newspapers, as well as 
internet and outdoor advertising; professional journal advertising reflects advertising expenditures for 
prescription drugs appearing in medical journals; sales representative details include costs associated with the 
sales activities of pharmaceutical representatives that are directed to office-based physicians, hospital-based 
physicians, and directors of pharmacies; samples are prescription drugs given to physicians to disseminate 
freely to patients.
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Figure 2
Direct-To-Consuming (DTC) Advertising Evolution For Older and Newer Antidepressants 
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Figure 2
Direct-To-Consuming (DTC) Advertising Evolution For Older and Newer Antidepressants 
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Direct-To-Consumer (DTC) Advertising in the U.S. Antidepressant Market by Medium
Notes: Print includes Business-to Business, Consumer, Hispanic Local and Sunday Magazines and 
Hispanic, Local and National Newspapers; Television includes Cable, Network, Spanish Language and 
Spot Television and Syndication; Radio includes Local, National Spot and Network Radio. 
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